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A strong and growing private sector is a critical factor for the promotion of 
growth and the increase of opportunities for all. A vibrant business sector would 
mean economic investment, job creation, improvement in overall productivity, and an 
increase in the economic pie for all those involved in a society. To foster the growth 
of a legal business sector, governments and policy makers around the world have 
been interested in learning about effective policies and implementing wide-ranging 
reforms. This general policy climate which supports and enhances the growth of the 
formal private business sector has been called a business-enabling environment. 
The fundamental premise is that growth of the official business sector of 
economic activity requires good regulations, strong economic fundamentals, and a 
nourishing sociopolitical structure. The question to which this dissertation responds is 
which of these factors are quantitatively significant in describing the number of 
registered businesses worldwide and how these factors compare to each other when 
they are tested econometrically beside each other.  
  
Would the ease of doing business variables still be significant in describing 
the number of registered businesses when it is compared to fundamental macro policy 
factors such as corporate tax rate? How far does business bribery affect business 
growth? 
This dissertation presents an effort to quantitatively analyze these factors and 
their effects on the business growth worldwide. It also offers an estimate on the 
amount of annual business to government bribery around the world disaggregated to a 
national level. It offers an estimation of national annual bribes paid by the business 
sector to governments, in each country worldwide, in the currency of that country at 
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Now my charms are all o'erthrown, And what strength I have's mine own, 
But release me from my bands, With the help of your good hands. 
Gentle breath of yours my sails. Must fill, or else my project fails, 
As you from crimes would pardon'd be, Let your indulgence set me free. 
--The Tempest, Shakespeare 
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Chapter 1: Enabling Environments 
 
A 30% tax rate for a $456 income 
In Tanzania, the 30% tax rate becomes applicable at US$456 (shs 720,000 
Tanzanian shilling) of individual income and same rate of 30% is also applicable for 
marginal corporate tax rate (Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2012), these tax burden 
gets an additional 18-20% value added tax (VAT) on top which is applicable to a 
wide variety of goods and services (Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2006). When on an 
income of US$456, there is a tax rate of 30% plus an additional 18-20% VAT, it 
becomes very hard to build capital and to become an entrepreneur who would 
willingly register his or her business to pay taxes.  
In result, fewer infrastructures get built, less goods and services will be 
available, and those businesses which are working would do their best to evade taxes 
through not registering their business. This also affects the Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) to these countries. While less developed countries have a comparatively low 
average wage, but international companies would not invest there in result of harsh 
environments for business activities.  
This example presents the importance of business-enabling policy 
environments for growth of a country. A strong and growing private sector is a 
critical factor for the promotion of growth and the increase of opportunities for all. A 
vibrant business sector would mean economic investment, job creation, improvement 




society. To this end, the importance of business sector growth and entrepreneurship 
for long term sustainable development of countries has been well studied in literature 
(Acs, Desai, & Klapper, 2008; Acs & Szerb, 2007; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; van Stel, Storey, & 
Thurik, 2007). 
To foster the growth of a legal business sector, governments and policy 
makers around the world have been interested in learning about effective policies and 
implementing wide-ranging reforms. This general policy climate which supports and 
enhances the growth of the formal private business sector has been called a business-
enabling environment. 
The decision of an entrepreneur to invest in trying out a business idea and to 
establish it as a registered business could be influenced by a number of variables. 
They could include perceptions of ease of doing business factors such as the difficulty 
of dealing with related rules and regulations, the classical macro policy factors such 
as corporate tax rate, and general environmental factors such as governance and the 
corruption situation of that country.  
The fundamental premise is that growth of the official business sector of 
economic activity requires good regulations, strong economic fundamentals, and a 
nourishing sociopolitical structure. The question to which this dissertation responds is 
which of these factors are quantitatively significant in describing the number of 
registered businesses worldwide and how these factors compare to each other when 




Would the ease of doing business variables still be significant in describing 
the number of registered businesses when it is compared to fundamental macro policy 
factors such as corporate tax rate? How far does business bribery affect business 
growth?  
This dissertation presents an effort to quantitatively analyze these factors and 
their effects on the business growth worldwide. It also offers an estimate on the 
amount of annual business to government bribery around the world disaggregated to a 
national level. The final chapter offers a case study of the issue utilizing 
agglomeration-dispersion models in one country. 
The first paper titled “Business-enabling policy environments” utilizes the 
size of formal business sector to empirically analyze the policy factors relevant to 
business-enabling environments. As the paper shows, the size of formal business 
sector across the globe can have diverse implications. It can help us understand 
relationship between formal sector and government taxation, study the factors 
affecting the size of legal and shadow economy, and provide insights into the policies 
for supporting entrepreneurship.  
The World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey (WBES) has collected business 
registration data from 112 countries for the past six years. Utilizing this data source 
this paper attempts to explore the relationship of a number of macroeconomics and 
sociopolitical factors with the growth of the formal business sector by using the 
multiple variable random effect Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression method. 
The second paper titled “Developing a Business Bribery Index (BBI), A new 




estimate the amount of annual business-to-government bribery around the world 
disaggregated to a national level. It offers an estimation of national annual bribes paid 
by the business sector to governments, in each country worldwide, in the currency of 
that country at the time, and the equivalent amount in US dollars.  
The paper presents a cross-country time-series index and methodology for 
measuring bribe paid by businesses to the government officials, by utilizing more 
than 130,000 face-to-face interviews with business managers in 130 countries over 10 
years. This paper also provides a comparison with current corruption measurement 
indices, testing their explanatory power to describe real world variables related to the 
business environment. The Business Bribery Index (BBI) introduced in this paper is 
an example of the “experience-based” method in corruption quantification.  
The depth of data used in creating BBI enables it to be both an aggregate 
panel data on bribery and corruption of countries over time and across countries, and 
a disaggregated source of bribery data for a particular country, in a specific year, in a 
certain sector of business (i.e., manufacturing, agriculture, or service), and for a 
specific business size (i.e., small, medium, and large businesses).  
For example, BBI can answer what the “going rate” for business bribes were 
in Argentina in 2006 in $US, and it can answer what the “going rate” for business 
bribes were in the middle size service sector of Argentina in 2006 in $US. Below is 







Figure 1. Business Bribery Index, 2008 
 
Darker color indicates more bribery reported. 
Colors range from dark red to lighter red each indicates 20 percentiles. 
 
 
Across the limited literature on bribery, there is no consensus or even 
prediction as to who initiates a bribe, the distinction between the supply and demand 
sides of bribery, or how a value-enabling policy environment could be created. While 
bribery is as old as human trade, the empirical estimation of this inherently human 
phenomenon has not been explored.  
Utilizing BBI, the paper analyzes the effects of business bribery on the value-
generation dynamics in the business-government relationships and the factors 
affecting corruption mechanisms between the private sector and the public sector 
across the globe. This paper attempts to explore the relationship of a number of 




government bribery by using the multiple variable random effect GLS method and the 
Bayesian statistics.  
The final paper titled “Regional dimensions of economic development in Iran, 
a New Economic Geography approach” presents a spatial analysis on regional 
dimensions of economic development across provinces of Iran. It offers the first ever 
estimation made in the Middle East using this strand of “New Economic Geography” 
(NEG) models and provides a comparison of the results between previously studied 
developed countries and Iran as a developing country. 
The goal of this study is to offer an analysis of the effects of agglomeration 
and dispersion economies on the patterns of regional economic development in Iran. 
It analyzes the linkages among adjacent provinces as well as effects of agglomeration 
and dispersion economies on the patterns of Iran’s regional economic development 
through empirical estimation of two of the NEG models. 
First, it presents an estimation of a “Market Potential Function” (MPF), in 
which wages are associated with proximity to consumer markets. Second, the paper 
estimates an augmented MPF derived from the Krugman model of economic 
geography. The parameters in this model estimate the importance of transportation 
cost and economies of scale.  
The estimation results suggest that Iran showed generally good fit to both 
models and satisfied both MPF and Krugman model specifications. Compared to 
other similar studies in developed countries, Iran shows smaller returns to scale and 




The results of this dissertation indicate that the decision of an entrepreneur to 
invest on trying out a business idea and to establish a registered business could be 
influenced by a number of variables. The fundamental premise is that the growth of 
official business sectors of economic activity requires good regulations, strong 
economic fundamentals, and a nourishing sociopolitical structure.  
This work analyzed three general groups of factors: rules and regulations 
related to the ease of doing business, classic macro policies, and general business 
climates. In short, this work concludes that classic macroeconomics policies are the 
main effective variables and other variables are only significant if tested without the 
presence of these macroeconomics policies.  
This result is in fact intuitive. An entrepreneur would make the decision about 
formally registering a business more on the cost-benefit basis of the corporate tax rate 
and the amount of the financial incentives and loans that could be obtained through 
transition to the legal sector. While barriers of doing business, such as the number of 
days necessary to register a business, are important, however, compared to the main 
macroeconomics issues they lose their importance and would have an insignificant 
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Introduction and definitions 
A strong and growing private sector is a critical factor for the promotion of 
growth and the increase of opportunities for all. A vibrant business sector would 
mean economic investment, job creation, improvement in overall productivity, and an 
increase in the economic pie for all those involved in a society. To this end, the 
importance of business sector growth and entrepreneurship for long term sustainable 
development of countries has been well studied in literature (Acs, Desai, & Klapper, 
2008; Acs & Szerb, 2007; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; 
Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; van Stel, Storey, & Thurik, 2007).  
To foster the growth of a legal business sector, governments and policy 
makers around the world have been interested in learning about effective policies and 
implementing wide-ranging reforms. This general policy climate which supports and 
enhances the growth of the formal private business sector has been called a business-
enabling environment. In 1998, the Trade and Development Board of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) offered a definition for 
such business friendly policy climates:  
“Enabling environment is the expression that encompasses government 




environment that brings together suppliers and consumers in an inter-firm co-
operation manner” (UNCTAD, 1998).  
This definition was further described in the Marrakech Accords and the 
Marrakech Declaration by the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7) of the United 
Nations (UNFCCC) in 2001 (UNFCCC 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7), 2001). 
It described the enabling environments as focusing on “government actions, such as 
fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to 
technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency, 
all of which create an environment conducive to private and public sector technology 
transfer” (Ranganathan & Reynaers, 2003; UNFCCC 7th Conference of the Parties 
(COP7), 2001). 
While the general definitions have been provided, it is not yet completely 
clear as to which factors are the most relevant and where the highest productivity 
could be gained in an expansion of the formal business sector. Would the highest gain 
be in the improvement of macroeconomic conditions, where governments are 
committed to the economic health of their country, or in what shapes the daily 





The decision of an entrepreneur to invest in trying out a business idea and to 
establish it as a registered business could be influenced by a number of variables. 




of dealing with related rules and regulations, the classical macro policy factors such 
as corporate tax rate, and general environmental factors such as governance and the 
corruption situation of that country.  
The fundamental premise is that growth of the official business sector of 
economic activity requires good regulations, strong economic fundamentals, and a 
nourishing sociopolitical structure. The question to which this paper responds is 
which of these factors are quantitatively significant in describing the number of 
registered businesses worldwide and how these factors compare to each other when 
they are tested econometrically beside each other. Would the ease of doing business 
variables still be significant in describing the number of registered businesses when it 
is compared to fundamental macro policy factors such as corporate tax rate? 
This paper analyzes these factors in three general groups: rules and 
regulations related to the ease of doing business, classic macro policies, and general 
business climates. 
 
Classic macroeconomics policies 
Whether the entrepreneur would decide to implement the business idea, to 
abandon it, or to consider implementing it in another country might depend on how 
the general macroeconomics policies of each country are set up. For example, the 
amount of corporate tax, availability of credit to finance in the private sector, the 
overall health and growth of the economy measured by different measurements such 
as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could be examples of such classic 




A number of these factors are included in the empirical analysis of business 
registration in this paper and are described further in the data source section. 
 
Rules and regulations related to the ease of doing business 
This set of factors include “rules that establish and clarify property rights and 
reduce the cost of resolving disputes, rules that increase the predictability of 
economic interactions and rules that provide contractual partners with core 
protections against abuse” (Doing Business Group, 2012). The objective of this set of 
factors is to study the effect of regulations on business registration growth.  
For example, whether the entrepreneur would decide to register the business 
might depend on how simple it is to comply with the requirements for opening a new 
business or getting a construction permit and how efficient the mechanisms are for 
resolving commercial disputes or dealing with insolvency. 
While there are some aggregate rankings available for the ease of doing 
business across countries, including from both sources of data used in this paper,  the 
more disaggregate forms of such variables have also been tested in this paper. This is 
due to the high diversity of an economy’s business regulatory environment. As the 
following graph shows there is a high in-country variation in rankings across business 
variables. Focusing solely on the aggregate forms of business variables will disregard 
the in-country variability and could potentially undermine the accuracy of the 
research. 
 
This paper utilizes two data sources for such variables: The World Bank 




Foundation. Both of these data sources will be described in detail in the data source 
section of this paper. 
 
General nation-wide factors like governance and corruption 
Factors such as rules and regulations (e.g., business registry regulations) and 
macroeconomics policies (e.g., corporate tax rate) are under more direct control of 
policy makers. Similar to intentions to reform businesses sector development, these 
factors could be changed by short-term decisions of policy makers. This stands in 
contrast with general nation-wide factors such as governance and the corruption 
situation in a country. 
The quality of governance, the prevalence of corruption, or the freedom of 
media are more general factors which could arguably affect business registration in a 
country but are not as readily changeable by policy makers’ decisions. A limited 
number of quantified indices for these factors are available and they have been tested 
in this paper further described in the data source section. 
 
Formal vs. Informal business sector 
The size of formal business sector across the globe can have diverse 
implications. It can help us find the global size of shadow economy, understand 
relationships between the formal sector and government taxation, and provide 
multiple research opportunities.  
The World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey (WBES) collected business 




survey defines its unit of measurement as “any economic unit of the formal sector 
incorporated as a legal entity and registered in a public registry, which is capable, in 
its own right, of incurring liabilities and of engaging in economic activities and 
transactions with other entities” (Coolidge, Hornberger, & Luttikhuizen, 2008). 
While The World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey focused on quantifying the 
number of formally registered businesses and hence cannot directly inform us about 
this important section of economies, it can provide some ideas about the informal 
business sector of countries. The basic definitional distinction between formal and 
informal sectors is not very clear. In general, the literature focusing on “formal” firms 
is separate from the literature focusing on the “informal” sector and there is a wide 
diversity of definitions within the literature and across countries. 
In the broadest definition of “formal” businesses are those with at least some 
legal recognition by a governmental agency (e.g., a municipal administration). While 
the informal enterprises refers to “production units (mostly in the nonagricultural 
sector) that are not registered with the relevant authorities, for a wide range of 
reasons” (Coolidge, et al., 2008). The Non-Observed Economy has been defined by 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “those 
economic activities which should be included in the GDP but which are not covered 
in the statistical surveys or administrative records from which the national accounts 
are constructed” (OECD, 2002). 
The firms registered in the formal sector have a number of advantages over 
informal enterprises. For example, they have legal access to borrow money, invite 




They enjoy legal protection from police and the judicial system reducing the potential 
exposure to corruption and bribery and they have access to the use of legal contracts. 
This is in contrast to the enterprises in the informal sector which have none of the 
mentioned benefits, however, they would not need to pay corporate taxes and abide 
by burdensome regulations. 
Underground economies have been known to have a clear association with 
corruption as “higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent 
of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity” (Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 2000). In such situations, entrepreneurs 
would have an incentive to work underground and informally to both avoid taxes and 
to reduce the burden of regulations, bureaucracy, and its subsequent corruption. This 
in turn would reduce both the size of the formal business sector and the tax revenue 
collected for public services. As a result, it could be claimed that the “corrupt 
governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments 
can sustain high tax rates” (Friedman, et al., 2000). 
 
Enterprise-level quantification efforts 
While the general questions in this field are not new, the quantification of 
many related variables is very recent and as a result the empirical study of these 
factors has just recently begun. Until less than a decade ago, there were no globally 
available sets of variables for analyzing enterprises in a cross-country panel format or 




The first efforts aiming to fill this gap “mostly drew on perceptions data from 
expert or business surveys that capture often one-time experiences of businesses” 
(Doing Business Group, 2012). As discussed in details in the “Business Bribery 
Index” paper, while perception surveys can be useful in gauging economic and policy 
conditions, they suffer from numerous methodological and conceptual shortcomings. 
In addition, very few of the available perception surveys provide annual updates of 
the mentioned variables with global coverage. 
Since 2000, few global data collection efforts by major organizations that 
have started are continuing on an annual basis. Four major efforts have been 
undertaken by The World Bank including The WBES, The World Bank Enterprise 
Survey, The World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), and The World Bank Doing Business Survey. 
 
 
1. The World Bank Doing Business Survey 
The World Bank Doing Business Survey (Doing Business Survey) focuses on 
“domestic, primarily small and medium-size companies and measures the regulations 
applying to them through their life cycle” (Doing Business Group, 2012). The Doing 
Business Survey includes quantitative indicators on business regulation compared 
across 183 economies and over time. The Doing Business Survey complements other 
surveys by focusing on the major constraints for businesses, both the experiences of 






2. The World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey 
The WBES is collected globally to enhance the knowledge of private 
enterprise dynamics through the “collection of data on business creation at the 
international level that can be comparable across heterogeneous legal, economic, and 
political systems” (WBES, 2010). This survey is discussed in details in the data 
sources section of this paper. 
 
3. World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) 
World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and The World Bank. The BEEPS has been conducted in 1999, 2002, 
and 2005 and covers virtually all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey. It includes detailed information such as 
bribes paid by a firm as a share of its annual sales and percent of annual sales used for 
protection payments (World Bank, 1999-2009). 
The quality of data collection in BEEPS has been tested and cited by multiple 
academic papers and has generally received very positive reviews. For example, 
Hellman et al. (2000) tested the quality of BEEPS data and concluded that “cross-
country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or 
underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new 
test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS” 




4. The World Bank Enterprise Survey 
The World Bank Enterprise Survey (The Enterprise Survey) is one of The 
World Bank’s largest and longest surveys covering a broad spectrum of business 
climate topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, competition, and 
performance measures. The World Bank has collected this data from face-to-face 
interviews with top managers and business owners at over 130,000 companies in 125 
economies (World Bank, 2009). The sample size in both BEEPS and The Enterprise 
Survey varies between 150 and 1,320 business managers in each country depending 




Number of registered businesses 
Definitions and data structure 
The WBES has collected business registration data from about 125 countries 
over the past six years. The businesses are defined as private companies with limited 
liability, which is the most prevalent business form in most economies around the 
world. Notably, this is the same definition used by The World Bank’s Doing Business 
index (Doing Business Group, 2012) the data of which is also used in this paper. By 
this definition, partnerships and sole proprietorships are not included to keep the 




In addition, the data focuses on the formal (officially registered) sector of the 
economy. Data on the informal sector has not been included as there is no reliable 
measurement for this sector of the economy. One suggested way to estimate the size 
of the informal business sector is through economic censuses. Economic censuses are, 
however, considerably costly and are not performed on a consistent nor global 
manner. Even if the high cost for such a measure is covered, offering a reliable 
estimate for an informal economy out of economic censuses would be of questionable 
quality. 
However, even at its current stage, WBES data provides a venue for further 
analysis of the growth ratio between the informal private sector and the formal private 
sector. This enables us to study the policy environments and factors encouraging 
firms to make the transition to the formal sector.  
 
Business Entry Density 
Utilizing the WBES data as a measure for new entries into the private sector 
could also be defined. This Entry Density measure is calculated using the number of 
newly registered businesses as a percentage of each country’s working age population 
(ages 15-65), normalized by 1,000. 
 
The World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey data 
Survey Structure 
The WBES is collected globally to enhance the knowledge of private 




international level that can be comparable across heterogeneous legal, economic, and 
political systems” (WBES, 2010). According to The World Bank’s data collection 
quality standards and to ensure the cross country comparability of data, the collected 
data is based on a defined unit of measurement and concept of the private sector 
which is applicable and available among the multiple countries surveyed. 
WBES’s main source of information is national business registries. Most 
countries surveyed have a governmental entity in charge of business registration or 
collecting data on all businesses, companies, trademarks and brands. In a limited 
number of countries where this is not possible the WBES has substituted alternatives 
sources “such as statistical agencies, tax and labor agencies, chambers of commerce, 
and private vendors (such as D&B)” (WBES, 2010). 
The WBES collected the data through email, fax, and phone interviews. In 
2010, 150 national business registries were contacted and from them 125 countries 
responded to the survey. After processing the collected data, the business registration 
data for 112 countries were released. 
 
Survey Shortcomings 
WBES data has a number of limitations which need to be addressed. 
However, if these shortcomings are properly noted they are not impediments in the 
usefulness of the data.  
1. The main challenge, as mentioned before, is that the WBES data only 
covers a certain type of formally registered private sector in countries. This limits the 




2. The second challenge is that the data is only provided in a national 
aggregate fashion. WBES does not disaggregate its data based on different types of 
formal sector activities and the size of the businesses.  
3. The recent release of the WBES does not include the number of total 
registered firms. This has been justified “since most countries do not accurately 
collect data on total active or inactive firms. Therefore, we are concerned that the 
stock number of total firms includes many closed firms that did not formally de-
register. Furthermore, the process to remove inactive firms from the Registrar varies 
widely across countries” (WBES, 2010).  
This could be a major challenge for the quality of data in WBES. The World 
Bank hasn’t provided further details about this; it would be preferable if WBES 
would disclose the details and extent of this problem in each country. 
4. Another potentially major challenge is introduced by the data 
processing WBES staff is performing on the data it collects. The WBES team 
sometimes changes the data collected from the official data which is published by the 
individual countries.  
They justify this as a measure to unify the methodologies, “the reason is that 
local statistical agencies might use a different methodology than the one used by the 
WBES. For instance, the European Statistical Agency (Eurostat) uses a methodology 
based on the minimum number of employees to measure entrepreneurship. As a 
result, in some cases the data published by Eurostat and the WBES, while accurate in 




This becomes a potential problem due to the lack of transparency by the 
WBES in the publication of its results. The published data is a final product and there 
is no way for researchers to know what the original collected data was and whether 
the cleaning process was accurate or is adhering to the researchers’ data needs. 
5. A number of challenges has made the creation of WBES data 
impossible in some countries. These include the decentralization of the business 
registries, lack of the professional and technical resources, and inefficient legal 
support of the data collection process.  
In addition, several countries do not collect the necessary data for WBES or 
do not possess the capacity to process the data once collected. As a result, WBES is 
only covering112 countries in its current dataset, mostly from the developed 
economies. 
6. WBES also excludes the data collected from countries categorized by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) as 
offshore financial centers. WBES believes that “the information provided by these 
countries likely reflects a nontrivial amount of shell companies, defined as companies 
that are registered for tax purposes, but are not active businesses. Such corporations 
may be set up for illegal purposes, such as tax evasion, or formed in anticipation of 
attracting funding” (WBES, 2010). 
 
The World Bank Doing Business data 
The World Bank Doing Business group has been collecting data and 




data investigates the regulations and conditions enhancing and constraining business 
activities. Doing Business includes quantitative indicators on business regulation for 
183 economies over nine years. 
World Bank Doing Business Survey covers eleven areas of the business 
regulations: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and employing workers.  
 
Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 
The Index of Economic Freedom is a series of economic measurements 
created by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. The objective for 
this index is to measure the degree of economic freedom across countries utilizing an 
approach similar to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations that “basic institutions that 
protect the liberty of individuals to pursue their own economic interests result in 
greater prosperity for the larger society” (Kane, 2007).  
The index includes ten variables: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial 









Utilizing The WBES this paper attempts to explore the relation of a number of 
macroeconomics and sociopolitical factors with the growth of the formal business 
sector by using the multiple variable random effect Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
regression method. 
This paper utilizes the mentioned data on the total number of registered 
businesses per country for each year and normalizes this factor by the urban 
population of each country for each year. By doing this, the paper utilizes a measure 
of business registry density for its empirical analysis of the issue. 
The overall methodology can be broadly divided into three steps:  
1) Variables that can influence the business registration are collected,  
2) The relationship between the influencing variable and business registration 
is formulated using a regression equation,   
3) The prediction accuracy of the model has been studied using a number of 
new data exploration techniques such as Naïve Bayes, Classification And Regression 
Tree (CART), Cluster Analysis (hierarchical modeling), and Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).  





Identification of variables & their relationship with business registration 
Based on these studies and theoretical understanding of the relationship, the 
following variables were identified as potentially influencing variables:  
i) Formal business sector size: The business registered directly proportional to 
the size of the urban population where most of the formal businesses are registered.  
ii) Financial environment:  Formal businesses are also directly proportional to 
the availability of private and public credit in the market. The financial environment 
relationship with business formulation could flow in both directions, on one hand 
financial credit may require the establishment of a formal business entity causing an 
increase in the business market size. On the other hand, as businesses grow, existing 
businesses can require more credit for expansion and growth of the businesses.  
iii) Business Environment: Tax rates and cumbersome regulations can 
negatively alter the business flow. High tax rates discourage new businesses to enter 
as well as existing businesses to switch to new businesses. Similarly the cumbersome 
business regulations can decrease business growth.  
iv) Infrastructure: Stronger infrastructure can influence foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and improves the business growth by reducing the transaction cost. 
While they are important variables, the construction of new infrastructure generally 
takes multiple years and hence lacks the variability for a robust regression. 
Infrastructure variables were dropped out.   
V) Governance and political factors: Stronger and less corrupt governance 
provides the political environment and other environments necessary for business 




evaluated using available World Governance Indicators and civil war indices from the 
Polity IV democracy and civil violence datasets. 
 
Clustering of countries 
Data presented in WBES exhibits a wide variation across regions and income 
groups. For example, for every four new firms registered every year per 1,000 people 
in high income countries, there is only less than one new firm registered in lower 
income countries. The following chart clearly presents the amount of diversity among 
income groups of countries. 
An attempt to develop a single regression that best fits all the countries was 
challenging because of countries with a wide range of business growth according to 
GDP. Advanced countries grew at a slower pace while businesses in emerging 
economies were more prominent.  
In result, clusters were formulated based on GDP per capita. The K-mean 
clustering method was used to formulate five different kinds of clusters. The 
information of cluster distribution is provided as follows: 
 
Table 1. World Bank Country Classification 
World Bank Country 
Classification 
Cluster ID 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Low Income  0 0 39 0 0 0 39 
Lower-middle income 7 0 44 0 0 0 51 
Non-OECD   0 11 0 5 3 0 19 
OECD 0 7 0 3 17 0 27 
Upper-middle income 33 1 2 0 0 6 42 






Different models of regression analysis (i.e., linear, time and entity fixed and 
random effect) were tested with the combinations of the above-mentioned 
independent variables. The goal of the regression analysis was to find an equation that 
best predicts the dependent variable i.e., business registered per capita.  
In result, two criteria were used to find the ideal regression:  
1) The independent variables used were statistically significant.  
2) The percentage difference between the real value and the predicted 
dependent variable is least. The following formula was used to calculate the 
percentage difference:  
= [(YEstimated - YReal) / YReal] x 100 
 
Dependent and Independent variables 
Dependent Variable: Business per urban capita was chosen as the dependent 
variable. Per urban capita normalizes the size of the country.  
Independent Variables: Following are the key independent variable that had a 
significant result on regression.  
 
1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$): GDP value has a strong direct 




the economies ranked by GDP per capita quintiles are strongly related to the business 
density. 
 
2. Domestic credit to private sector 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP): Domestic credit availability 
calculated as a percentage of a country’s GDP has an equally significant relationship 
with business per capita. Similar to GDP the following graph depicts that the 
economies ranked by their domestic credit quintiles are strongly related to the 
business density. 
 
3. Highest marginal tax rate 
Highest marginal tax rate (corporate rate): It is the highest rate shown on the 
schedule of tax rates applied to the taxable income of corporations. Corporate tax 
rates also have significant relationships with the business capita.  
The comparison of WBES data with measures of country-level governance 
provides us further knowledge about the effect of the overall economic, political and 
financial conditions of the countries over time. The strong relationship between the 
number of registered businesses and corporate tax rate are robust when controlling for 
the income-level dummies in a multivariate panel data econometric analysis. 
 
4. Ease of Doing Business indices 
WBES data shows a level of significant relationship between various 




registrations. One of these measures is the Doing Business ranking which is a 
summary measure of the various business environment indicators containing a 
country’s overall rank. There is a positive correlation between a country’s overall 
Doing Business ranking and the firm registrations. 
In addition, there are strong negative correlations between a country’s firm 
registrations and three of the Doing Business indicators: procedures to start a 
business, cost to start a business (% Gross National Income (GNI)), and days to start 
a business. As shown in the regression results these Doing Business factors tend to 
also be significant to describe that the initial business environment is important for 
firm registrations. 
To ensure that the results are driven by the business enabling policy 
environment rather than the overall level of development in a country or other macro 
policies, the analysis controls for GDP per capita, marginal corporate tax rate, credit 
availability to the private sector, and the business bribery level. As shown in the full 
regression results, the significance of the Doing Business variables are not anymore 
present in comparison to the mentioned factors. 
 
5. Governance indices 
As shown in the graph, there is also a positive correlation between business 
density and the governance composite indices. This result has been confirmed when 
regressing governance alone on business density; however, when included with other 





Panel data OLS regression utilizing the random effect model 
Using the mentioned variables, the following quantitative analysis has been 
performed. The method used is panel data Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
utilizing the random effect model. 
yit = α + β'Xit + uit 
Utilizing the panel data the quality of the econometrics analysis would be 
significantly enhanced as with “the combination of time series with cross-sections can 
enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only 
one of these two dimensions” (Gujarati, 2003). 
In addition, panel data enables us to control for unobserved variables or 
factors which are known but are impossible to quantify “like cultural factors or 
difference in business practices across companies; or variables that change over time 
but not across entities (i.e. national policies, federal regulations, international 
agreements, etc.). This is, it accounts for individual heterogeneity” (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Hausman specification test 
There is an important question of whether the panel regression analysis should 
utilize the fixed effect or random effect modeling. Generally, random effects offer 
efficient results compared to the fixed effects model if the underlying assumptions are 
satisfied.  
The main difference is that unlike the fixed effects model, in the random 
effects model the variation across entities is assumed to be unsystematic and 




distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved individual 
effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not 
whether these effects are stochastic or not” (Greene, 2011). 
The main advantage of the random effects model is that the time invariant 
variables are being utilized while in the fixed effects model these variables are 
absorbed by the intercept. This is because the random effects model assumes no 
correlated error term with the predictors which in turn allows for time-invariant 
variables to influence the regression as explanatory variables. The random effects 
model is: 
 
Considering the definition, if differences across entities would influence the 
dependent variable then the random effects model should be utilized in the regression. 
This can also be tested by running the random effects model, then running the fixed 
effects model, and finally performing a Hausman specification test. If the Hausman 
specification test rejects the hypothesis, then the random effects model is biased and 
the fixed effects model is the correct estimation procedure. The Hausman 









Data Exploration Techniques 
Initial set-up 
As the nature of the task is more exploratory than predictive, the initial 
techniques were assumed to be Categorical Response and Data Reduction models. 
One of the questions for the Categorical Response was, can the variable of interest, 
bus_reg_urban, be transformed into a categorical output? Based on the statistical 
summary, the mean, median and mode were the same value whereby one could not 
simply take an average and classify any value above the average as 0 and any value 
below to be 1, especially when all three measures of the average value itself were the 
same (0.0332) and consisted of approximately 80% of the data points. A decision was 
then made to bin this variable data using two bins based on the median value of each 
bin. Prior to the binning process, a time series chart was created showing the average 
bus_reg_urban per year of the 11 year period including a trend line just to get a sense 
of the variable over time. 
Additional variables that had a large set of non-distinctive values were also 
binned otherwise XLMiner would not allow the model to run. Once the binning was 
complete, the data was partitioned using a Training Data of 60% and Validation of 
40%. Since the number of records for this data set was relatively small, there was no 
need to increase the Training Data percentage. Before running the models the 
assumptions were assessed as to whether the process had been reasonable. Although a 
few predictors exhibited outliers, it was concluded that leaving those data as part of 





Naïve Bayes  
The first technique that was run was Naïve Bayes. The best model resulted 
initially in an Overall % Error of 4.32 with a Cut off of 0.5. This was improved upon 
by using a 0.8 Cut off as shown below: 
 
Table 2. Naïve Bayes results 
Cut off Prob.Val. for Success (Updatable) 0.8 
    
Classification Confusion Matrix  
 Predicted Class  
Actual Class 0.06 0.04  
0.06 70 34  
0.04 18 1383  
    
Error 
Report 
   
Class # Cases # Errors % Error 
0.06 104 34 32.69 
0.04 1401 18 1.28 




During the exploration of this data set, multiple Classification and Data 
Reduction tools were used to see if useful information or meaningful patterns within 
the data would emerge. Although a few tools provided low error rates, one of the 
fundamental takeaways is that the accuracy and quality of the data set is absolutely 



















































used. Data mining is also dependent on an individual’s domain knowledge and is an 
iterative process. However, using a variety of the appropriate tools can help lead to 
new and unintended discoveries. 
 
Conclusion of data exploration techniques 
In order to simplify and better understand the factors influencing the number 
of registered businesses for a country in a given year, the output for each of the 
observations were separated into two groups: 0.06 and 0.04. 0.06 was the “success” 
class and represented the observations that had a higher number of registered 
businesses, while 0.04 represented the observations with the relatively lower number 
of registered businesses. Various models were then run to see if any valuable 
information could be gleaned from the data. 
In summarizing the various modeling techniques, the Naïve Bayes results 
show that it was effective in identifying records of the 0.6 class which were binned as 
the group with the higher number of average registered businesses. The variables that 
played more of a factor were Martax, where the tax rate increased the probability of 
occurrence depicted in the conditional probabilities which showed a significant drop 
off in number of registered businesses. Cr_priv was another influential factor while 
bribe_0_dollar_sale was not really a factor. The lift chart shows the model provided a 
strong lift in predicting the 0.6 class. Likewise, the decile chart shows the model 
significantly outperformed a random assignment of the two classes.  
The PCA output showed that Binned_wbc_val, Binned_cr_priv, Martax, and 




Hierarchical Clustering, other than “10” being a singleton cluster and six showing a 
reasonable number of clusters for the dataset, the output does not seem to yield 
meaningful results. It is possible that modifying the choice of distance between 
clusters, other than Euclidian, could yield good results. Additionally, this could be 
strongly affected by the outliers previously observed. The Classification Tree was not 
effective as the success class had a 100% error rate. One possibility is that this model 
may be missing relationships between some of the predictors especially if early on in 
the process one predictor is used towards the top of the tree. 
 To glean the most impactful predictors yielded from the models, domestic 
credit to the private sector and corporate tax rate are the top tier predictors on how the 
number of businesses grows. This seems reasonable as new business ventures would 
be more attractive in countries that invest a significant proportion of capital into 
domestic businesses as well as firms shying away from countries with high tax rates, 
with everything else being equal.  
The next tier of influential factors would be GDP per capita, the World Bank 
Governance Indicator, as well as countries Corruption Levels. This also appears to be 
a reasonable assessment as higher GDP generally indicates a countries economic 
health and businesses would be able to serving markets with people able to spend 
more on products and services. Additionally, it is reasonable that countries with less 
corruption are attractive to businesses as it aids in a firm’s ability to retain profits 








Below is a description of the variables included in the regression analysis and 
their sources of data. 
 
Table 3. Variables involved 
Variable 
name Description Source 
Registered 
Business* Total businesses registered (number) per urban capita World Bank 
WB 
Corruption 
Control of Corruption, World Bank Governance 
Indicator World Bank 
BBI 
Business Bribery Index (BBI), in US dollar, weighted 
by average annual sale of businesses in the country-
year 
Farmanesh (2011), 
using World Bank, etc. 
data 
Credit to 
Private Domestic credit available to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank 
GDP GDP per capita World Bank 
Mar Corp 
Tax Highest marginal corporate tax rate (%) World Bank 
CPI Corruption Perception Index Transparency Intl. 
Freedom 
House 
FH Liberal Democracy Combined Polity Score, 
standardized 
This variable is a modified version of the POLITY 
variable added in order to facilitate the use of the 
POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It 
modifies the combined annual POLITY score by 
applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert 
instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -
77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within 





Polity IV Polity IV Constitutional Democracy, standardized GMU-UMD 
PRS International Country Risk Guide Political Risk Services 
Doing 
Business Overall Score, Heritage Index of Freedom Heritage Foundation 
DB Corrupt Freedom From Corruption, Heritage Index of Freedom Heritage Foundation 
DB Freedom Business Freedom, Heritage Index of Freedom Heritage Foundation 
Lab_tert Workforce with tertiary education World Bank 
 
 
Summary statistics of key variables 
Table below presents the summary statistics of key variables in this study. 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable          Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bus_capita 26.5756 26.28498 0.120767 164.5732 
GDPcapita 21851.81 10990.28 847.1991 45948.72 
Pop_urpp 70.70443 13.45077 27.94 100 
Lab_tert 26.42973 13.67774 3.1 83.3 
Cr_bank 91.42579 62.80642 12.8379 307.2689 
Cr_priv 79.79661 57.00963 6.3985 211.8094 
avg_WBGov 0.8412929 0.8031756 -1.00039 1.95612 
overall 65.32324 9.286687 41.3 88.6 
Business_Fr 72.14919 12.03246 46.6 100 
Fiscal 65.42432 15.56676 29.8 99.9 








Table below presents the regression results of the most applicable cases in this 
study. 
 




The results of this paper indicate that the decision of an entrepreneur to invest 
on trying out a business idea and to establish a registered business could be 
influenced by a number of variables. The fundamental premise is that the growth of 
official business sectors of economic activity requires good regulations, strong 
economic fundamentals, and a nourishing sociopolitical structure.  
This paper analyzed these factors in three general groups: rules and 




business climate. In general, the paper concludes that classic macroeconomics 
policies are the main effective variables and other variables are only significant if 
tested without the presence of these macroeconomics policies.  
This result is in fact intuitive. An entrepreneur would make his/her decision 
about registering the business formally more on the basis of whether the tax cost is 
high and the amount of financial incentives that could be received. While barriers of 
entry to markets, such as number of days it takes to register a business, are important 
but compared to the main issues they lose their importance and would have an 
insignificant effect in the level of a nuisance rather than a true impediment. 
 
Classic macroeconomics policies 
Whether the entrepreneur would decide to implement the business idea, to 
abandon it, or consider implementing it in another country might depend on how the 
general macroeconomics policies of each country are set up.  
As the results indicate, the classic macroeconomics policies are the most 
influential factors in the growth of the formal business sector. Specifically the amount 
of corporate tax rate, availability of credit to finance in the private sector, the overall 
health and growth of the economy measured by different measurements such as GDP 






Rules and regulations related to the ease of doing business 
The objective of this set of factors was to study the effect of regulations on 
business registration growth. The results of the paper indicate that these variables 
have significant effect on the number of registered businesses; however their 
influence is not robust as they lose their significant influence when classic 
macroeconomics policies are entered into the empirical analysis. 
 
General nation-wide factors like governance and corruption 
The results of the paper indicate that some of the general nation-wide factors 
are significant like the quality of governance, however similar to ease of doing 
business; they are not robust when classic macroeconomics policies are included. 
Factors such as democracy and freedom of media are not significant even when they 
are included alone. The prevalence of corruption is not significant if tested using 
aggregate indices such as Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), however, utilizing a specific and disaggregate index such as the Business 
Bribery Index (BBI) would offer significant and robust results in describing the 








Acs, Z. J., Desai, S., & Klapper, L. F. (2008). What Does “Entrepreneurship” 
Data Really Show? The World Bank. 
Acs, Z. J., & Szerb, L. (2007). Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth and 
Public Policy. Small Business Economics, 28, 109-122. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (3 ed.): Wiley. 
Coolidge, J., Hornberger, K., & Luttikhuizen, R. (2008). Understanding and 
Improving Data on Entrepreneurship and Active Companies. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The 
regulation of entry. [Article]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 1-37. 
Doing Business Group. (2012). Doing business in a more transparent world. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., & Zoido-Lobaton, P. (2000). 
Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries. 
Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 459-493. 
Greene, W. H. (2011). Econometric Analysis (7 ed.): Prentice Hall. 
Gujarati, D. (2003). Basic Econometrics (4th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill. 
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., & Schankerman, M. (2000). 
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats 
Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies. The World Bank. 
Kane, T. (2007). Foreign Investment, Growth, and Economic Freedom: What 




Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006). Entry regulation as a barrier to 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(3), 591-629. 
OECD. (2002). Measuring the Non-Observed Economy A Handbook. 
Ranganathan, M., & Reynaers, E. (2003). Enabling environments for 
technology transfer FCCC/TP/2003/2. 
UNCTAD. (1998). TD/B/COM.2/33. Retrieved from 
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/EEnvironment.jsp. 
UNFCCC 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7). (2001). The Marrakech 
Accords and the Marrakech Declaration. 
van Stel, A., Storey, D., & Thurik, A. (2007). The Effect of Business 
Regulations on Nascent and Young Business Entrepreneurship. Small Business 
Economics, 28(2), 171-186. 
WBES. (2010). World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots FAQs. The 
World Bank Group. 
World Bank. (1999-2009). Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS). In W. Bank (Ed.). Washington DC. 
World Bank. (2009). World Bank Enterprise Survey Sampling Methodology. 
Washington DC: The World Bank Group. 
 
 








Corruption has become a high priority in the international agenda. As an 
integral part of “good governance” strategies of the international development 
community, curbing corruption has been given prominence and priority. To this 
effect, several bilateral development agencies, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), have developed specific anti-
corruption strategies to assist governments in tackling the problem. 
In addition, numerous international agreements and specialized agencies have 
been developed based on the issue. Two prominent examples are first, the UN 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), as the first legally-binding international 
anti-corruption agreement, entered into force in December 2005. Second example is 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which was designed to fight against the bribery 
practices of multinational companies in international business transactions, which was 
established on 17 December 1997 and came into force on 15 February 1999. 
In the practices of the business world the importance and visibility of the 
matter has also increased. Prominently, an agreement to control corporate bribery was 




Proposing an actual global monetary measure for corruption and in particular 
bribery (rather than the cost of corruption) is of interest in anti-corruption endeavors, 
enhancing our understanding of the underlying variables and increasing the general 
awareness of the matter. The examples of such measures are very limited at best and 
even in those few cases the numbers are not yet academically rigorous.  
This paper offers a conceptual review of corruption and governance topics as 
they interact with the measurement techniques and quantification methods used. This 
paper also highlights the challenges faced in the measurement of corruption, 
distinctions between the current measurement approaches, and a review of the 
strengths and weaknesses of such indices. 
This paper presents a new cross-country time-series index and methodology 
for measuring business bribery, by surveying the actual bribe paid by business 
managers to the governments worldwide. This paper also provides a comparison with 
current corruption measurement indices, testing their explanatory power to describe 
real world variables related to the business environment. 
 
Literature review 
Corruption, in general 
Corruption empirical literature in economics has witnessed a boom in the past 
decade. New frontiers in defining and assessing corruption have opened, and 




as papers by Amundsen & Fjeldstad and Jain  (Amundsen & Fjeldstad, 2000; Jain, 
2001).  
The most standard definition for corruption used by a number of sources is 
“the abuse of public office for private gain”(Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, 2008; Treisman, 2000). A similar broadly used description defines 
corruption as a transaction between public sector and private sector agents through 
which the collective goods are illegitimately converted into private possession 
(Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 1989). Another classic definition is provided by 
Colin Nye as “corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967). 
The World Bank’s main Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) strategy 
paper describes this definition further: “public office is abused when an official 
accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents give or offer 
bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and 
profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, 
through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state 
revenues” (World Bank, 2007). 
As mentioned, corruption is usually defined within a larger framework of 
“good governance”. In this framework, Governance is defined as “the manner in 




provide public goods and services, including the delivery of basic services, 
infrastructure, and a sound investment climate” (World Bank, 2007). 
Corruption is one outcome of weak governance – a consequence of the failure 
of accountability relationships in the governance system. These failures can span 
from failure of the citizen-politician relationship, possibly leading to “state capture”, 
to a failure of bureaucratic institutions and checks and balance measures, possibly 
resulting to “administrative corruption” (World Bank, 2011a). Poor delivery of 
services and a weak investment climate could be named as other possible outcomes of 
bad governance and corruption. 
The definition of corruption and its possible active agents has been further 
expanded to include the corruption where the private sector is involved. Transparency 
International has defined corruption in a manner which also includes the private 
sector actors, “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2011b). The World Bank also recognized the corruption in private 
sector: “Corruption can also take place among private sector parties, yet interface 
with and affect public sector performance: for example, collusion among bidders to a 
public procurement with the intent to defraud the state can seriously distort 
procurement outcomes.”(World Bank, 2007) 
The “abuse of public office” definition of corruption has been criticized as a 
Western-oriented definition based on the separation of the public and private sector 
models. Based on this criticism, this model of separation between public-private 
spheres, does not fit the cultural context of many developing countries (Kolstad, Fritz, 




have sometimes been the source of models used by academics and international 
agencies. However, in their view, any established and well-functioning society would 
inherently need a level of “productive allocation of tasks if it is to reap the benefits of 
organization and specialization,” and corruption, in this sense, can “be viewed as a 




Corruption, by definition, is a larger phenomenon than bribery practices which 
is the focus of this paper. A few suggestions have been made for disaggregating the 
concept of corruption. Colin Nye has suggested to categorized corruption as “bribery 
(use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism 
(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and 
misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses)” (Nye, 1967). 
Utilizing the reviews of the corruption literature (Amundsen, 2000) and an 
annotated bibliographical survey (Amundsen & Fjeldstad, 2000), another 
categorization for the definition of corruption has been suggested by Andvig et al. 
(Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000). Andvig et al. have 
identified four main forms of corruption as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and 







Bribery is understood as “the payment (in money or kind) that is given or 
taken in a corrupt relationship” (Andvig, et al., 2000). Depending on the context, 
different names have been used to describe bribery. Examples of alternative names 
given to bribery include kickbacks, gratuities, “commercial arrangements”, 
baksheesh, sweeteners, pay-offs, speed-money, and grease money. Bribery is the 
focus of this paper. 
 
Embezzlement, Fraud, and Extortion 
Embezzlement is the stealing of resources by the people responsible for 
administering them, e.g., theft of company property by disloyal employees. Fraud is 
an economic crime involving a level of trickery, swindle or deceit. Fraud includes 
“manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by public officials for 
their own profit”. Finally, Extortion has been defined as the “money and other 
resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats to use force” (Andvig, 
et al., 2000). 
 
Favoritism and Nepotism 
 Favoritism has been suggested as another subcategory of corruption by 
Amundsen. He has defined favoritism as “a mechanism of power abuse implying 
“privatization” and a highly biased distribution of state resources, no matter how 
these resources have been accumulated in the first place” (Amundsen, 1999). 




office holder (ruler) with the right to make appointments, prefers to nominate to 
prominent positions his proper kinfolk and family members” (Amundsen, 1999). 
 
Grand vs. Petty corruption 
Another usual differentiation in the concept of corruption is between grand 
and petty corruption. Grand or Political Corruption is when policy procedures and 
legislation are designed to benefit politicians and legislators, enabling them to exploit 
their positions to extract large sums of money or in-kind services from the private 
sector (Doig & Theobald, 2000).  
Grand Corruption is different from Petty Corruption. Petty Corruption, also 
known as “Bureaucratic” Corruption, “Low Level” Corruption, or “Street Level” 
Corruption, is the illicit practices usually in the lower level of public administration 
and implementation of policies. It is what citizens will experience in their daily 
dealings with police, customs, taxing agencies, etc. Doig and Theobald define it as 
“soliciting or extortion of small payments by low level officials in order to expedite 
business by cutting through red tape; or to do what they are supposed to do anyway” 
(Doig & Theobald, 2000).  
There is clearly a relationship between Grand and Petty Corruption, supported 
by studies showing that the Grand Corruption in the political levels increases Petty 
Corruption at the lower administrative levels (Chand & Moene, 1999). In this paper, 
the data used does not necessarily differentiate between Grand and Petty Bribery, but 
considering the proportion of bribes paid to the annual sale of a company we might be 




Why study corruption? 
The negative effects of corruption 
Corruption has been a persistent pandemic phenomenon covering every nation 
and society in our world throughout our modern history. Corruption is “probably as 
old as government itself” (Seldadyo & Haan, 2006) and “no region, and hardly any 
country, has been immune” (Glynn, Kobrin, & Naim, 1997) to it.  
This pandemic disease much like “a cancer that eats into the cultural, political 
and economic fabric of society, and destroys the functioning of vital organs,” 
(Amundsen, 1999) has been called by  Transparency International “one of the greatest 
challenges of the contemporary world”, undermining good governance and public 
policy making. It “leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector 
and private sector development and particularly hurts the poor” (Amundsen, 1999). 
The World Bank has recognized it as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and 
social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and 
weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends” 
(Seldadyo & Haan, 2006). 
The consequences and harms of corruption could be named in a long list 
including “insecure citizens, speculative politicians, and administrators vacillating 
between huge opportunities, grave risks and much double-pressure” (Amundsen, 
1999). Corruption’s destructive effects are especially severe on the poor, as they are 
“hardest hit by economic decline, are most reliant on the provision of public services, 
and are least capable of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and the 




is critical in the achievement of any poverty reduction strategy and development 




In contrast to the intuition that everything about corruption would be negative, 
a robust and significant number of literature citations has long argued that the benefits 
of corruption from an economic point of view, might outweigh the perceived costs 
(Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998; Braguinsky, 1996; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 
1985; Nye, 1967). As Huntington has wrote: “in terms of economic growth, the only 
thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized dishonest bureaucracy, is one 
with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy” (Huntington, 1968).  
The often made argument behind this line of literature is that bribery “greases 
the wheels” by reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks and ultimately improving the 
overall societal efficiency. This “efficient grease” argument assumes that the 
economic costs associated with extensive public regulations may be reduced or 
avoided through bribery. This argument has been refuted by numerous scholars, some 
suggesting that the regulatory burdens need to be analyzed endogenously (Bardhan, 
1997; Kaufmann & Wei, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, 1994; Tanzi, 
1998; Wei, 1997). 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) have found that “efficient grease” arguments might 
not necessarily be the case if it being  analyzed endogenously, “in a general 




rent-seeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery may be 
positively correlated across firms” (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). They have utilized data 
from three worldwide firm-level surveys, to examine the association between bribe 
payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. They found 
that “firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management 
time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of 
capital” (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). Furthermore, another perceived cost of corruption 
has been explored by researchers as the “distortions entailed by the necessary secrecy 
of corruption” which introduce negative effects of their own (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). 
In addition to the abovementioned, some new approaches to categorize 
corruption have emerged. Aidt (2003) suggests four different analytical approaches to 
corruption, categorizing them into Efficient Corruption, which “promotes allocative 
efficiency by allowing agents in the private sector to correct pre-existing government 
failures”; Corruption with a benevolent principal, where “corruption arises when a 
benevolent principal delegates decision making power to a non-benevolent agent”; 
Corruption with a non-benevolent principal, which “arises because non-benevolent 
government officials introduce inefficient policies in order to extract rents from the 
private sector,” and Self-reinforcing corruption, where “reward to corruption depends 
on the incidence of corruption due to strategic complementarity” and the institutional 






Principlism vs. Consequentialism 
As can be seen from different viewpoints reviewed on corruption, the study of 
corruption as a phenomenon and the subsequent anticorruption policies are regularly 
analyzed based on two rationales, Principlism and Consequentialism. The principlist 
view analyzes corruption from a moral point of view, regarding it as a vice in itself. 
While a consequentialist approach would rather look to the results and consequences 
of corruption, e.g., the ease of doing business and the subsequent growth, greater 
development aid effectiveness. 
The current tendency in most development policies are towards the 
consequentialist approach, where the corruption is denounced mostly in result of its 
perceived negative consequences. However, this approach “makes the anti-corruption 
agenda vulnerable to partial – and possibly shifting – interpretations of empirical 
results” (Kolstad, et al., 2008). This volatility might reduce the stability and 
effectiveness of anticorruption policies, and would question the commitment of 
development agencies working on the issue. The alternative would be to undertake a 
more principled approach, where it’s deceptive nature and it’s undermining effects on 
the moral and rational capacities of citizens and societies is recognized (Kolstad, et 
al., 2008). 
 
Corruption between public and private sectors 
A central role for the governments 
The role of government in relations to the private sector has been studied from 




protection of “property rights”. This includes a number of political philosophers with 
diverse ideological backgrounds such as Karl Marx, David Hume, and Robert Nozick. 
It also includes a large number of social scientists emphasizing the significant effect 
that the respect for property rights have had on the development of the western world 
(North & Thomas, 1973; Rosenberg & Bridzell, 1985).  
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) analyze the potential for misuse of power by 
bureaucrats in the enforcement of property rights, and the importance this type of 
corruption holds considering the pre-mentioned central duty social scientists see for 
the governments’ role in the economy as the protector of contracts made in the private 
sector. Acemoglu and Verdier propose that “it could be optimal for less developed 
economies, which may have less productive investment opportunities, to have a lower 
level of property right enforcement and more corruption” (Acemoglu & Verdier, 
1998). Their modified model actually suggests that although corruption is harmful to 
investments and production, a fully honest bureaucracy without any corruption might 
be too expensive for those societies to afford (Andvig, et al., 2000). 
 
Corruption and the private sector investment rate 
Among different ways that corruption in public sector negatively affects the 
private sector is in the investment rate. Mauro (1995) has shown that corruption has a 
negative impact on the ratio of investments to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Mauro 
shows that one standard deviation improvement in his quantification of corruption is 
estimated to be associated with an increase in the investment rate by about three 




source of quantification for corruption by Political Risk Services (PRS) (Knack & 
Keefer, 1995). 
Campus et al. (1999) took this suggestion further, looking to the fast economic 
growth East Asian countries have experienced despite their high levels of corruption. 
Campus et al. ask if Mauro and Knack & Keefer are correct why have East Asian 
countries been able to receive high levels of investment in comparison to other 
developing countries? In answering this question Campus et al. argue that “it is not 
only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption. 
Corruption regimes that are more predictable - in the sense that those seeking favors 
from government do obtain those favors - have less negative impact on investment 
than those that are less predictable” (Campos, et al., 1999). 
 
Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Corruption has been suggested to have a similar effect on the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Wei (1997) shows that the effects of unpredictability of corruption 
on FDI are economically and statistically significant, and that an increase in “the 
uncertainty level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico, at the average level of 
corruption in the sample, is equivalent to raising the tax rate on multinational firms by 
32 percentage points” (Wei, 1997). A similar effect has also been shown by Hellman 
et al. (2003) as “corruption reduces FDI inflows and attracts lower quality investment 
in terms of governance standards” (Hellman, Geraint, & Daniel, 2003). 
Considering that international investors who provide FDIs usually are making 




are to a degree ‘hostage’ to the invested enterprise, they tend to consider the general 
climate of the host country/sector in depth before entering into any such commitment. 
The level of corruption, strength of governance and rule of law, and respect for 
property rights are important factors that the private sector would need to be informed 
about before entering into a market. These are factors which are all in the realm of the 
public sector and if not taken seriously would easily discourage investors. As Arndt 
and Oman (2006) describe “the research departments of multinational corporate 
investors and banks now widely construct or use governance indicators to try to 
assess the general country risk and governance situation in potential investment 
locations” (Arndt & Oman, 2006). 
 
Bribery between public and private sectors 
A central channel for corruption between public and private sectors is the 
practice of bribery. Myrdal and Fund (1968) explained bribery as a product of 
personal incentives public officials have by putting pressure on the private sector and 
businesses through bureaucratic delays (Myrdal & Fund, 1968). Kaufmann and Wei 
(1999) also describe that “in an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay 
are exogenous, an individual firm may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red 
tape it faces” (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). 
When studying the approach public officials take in dealing with private 
sector Downs (1967) introduced the notion of "territoriality," which is the “expansion 
of bureaucracies into new regulations”(Downs, 1967). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 




allocation. They showed the high cost of territoriality when different agencies are not 
controlled by a central authority and are not honest. They explored the effects of 
territoriality further in the case of agencies imposing regulations independently with 
the specific purpose of maximizing their individual bribe revenues.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) argued that economic 
and political competition can reduce corruption and its effects, “If different agencies 
compete in the provision of the same services, corruption will be driven down 
provided that agents cannot simply steal” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Similarly 
Svensson (2003) shows in the case of Ugandan firms, the firms likely  to be involved 
in corruption depends on the regulatory system in their sector of business and the 
extent of required interaction with the public sector. They conclude that the 
business’s “ability to pay” and their “refusal power” are a large part of the variation 
in bribes paid and reported by firms and that “these results suggest that public 
officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are 
partly determined in order to extract bribes” (Svensson, 2003). 
Clarke and Xu (2002) have also corroborated this notion in their study of 
utility firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They found that “on the side of bribe 
takers, bribes paid to utilities are higher in countries with greater constraints on utility 
capacity, lower levels of competition in the utility sector, and where utilities are state-
owned” (Clarke & Xu, 2002). They also showed that utility sector bribes are 
correlated with a number of macroeconomic and political variables confirming 




Due to the very limited availability of empirical data on bribery practices, our 
knowledge of the internal dynamics of the relevant variables is to an extent that “the 
connection between competition and firms' propensity to offer bribes is not clear in 
the literature on corruption” (Soreide, 2006b). In addition the role of risk and attitudes 
towards it, on either the supply or demand sides, has not been explored (Soreide, 
2009).  
Across the limited literature on bribery (Batra, Kaufmann, & Stone, 2003; 
Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000; Soreide, 2008, 2009; 
Transparency International, 2008a), there is no consensus or even prediction as to 
who initiates the bribe nor a distinction between the supply and demand sides of 
bribery. While bribery is as old as human trade the empirical estimation of this 
inherently human phenomenon has not been explored. This paper is trying to enhance 
our knowledge of this important topic. 
 
Measurement of the non-observed 
Inherently unobservable 
Besides the mentioned difficulties and diversities in defining the phenomenon 
of corruption, we face a new set of challenges when trying to measure it. By nature 
non-observable phenomenon like governance, happiness, and corruption are difficult 
to measure. Corruption has an added layer of difficulty as it is usually carried out 
covertly, hidden from the public and official records.  
The ‘true’ level of corruption is extremely hard to measure and in some 




hypotheses made through the quantitative perception data, the challenge of corruption 
as a field of empirical research is still its secret nature” (Andvig, 2004). 
Some scholars have considered measuring corruption virtually impossible 
(Arndt & Oman, 2006; Sik, 2002). For example, Sik (2002) writes “I suggest as an 
axiom that it is impossible to measure the level of corruption” (Sik, 2002). Arndt et 
al. describes this difficulty further for governance indices as “based on perceptions, 
interpretations, and changing underlying data, these indicators pose many pitfalls for 
those who would use them as a scientific basis for decision-making and strategic 
planning, or to determine the progress of reform over time” (Arndt & Oman, 2006). 
 
Challenges 
 Aggregated and general corruption measurement indices face a challenge due 
to their large wide range, which might make them too general to meaningfully explain 
anything. When they are supposed to cover all different types of corruption, from 
national oil contracts to the facilitation of payments made to get a basic government 
service, the all-encompassing indices ranges are too wide to be meaningful. As a 
result, they would not be able to “distinguish between the forms of corruption that 
represent welfare problems, and the corruption that functions as a substitute for prices 
or public solutions in cases of weak or absent public institutions” (Soreide, 2006c). 
Another challenge in quantifying corruption is the comparative study of the 
different suggested quantification strategies. Since there are multiple definitions for 
corruption and multiple quantification approaches, it is hard to compare and 




estimating corruption ask a diverse list of questions related to corruption and are not 
precisely covering the same issue. For example, “some sources aim at political 
corruption, while others ask about lower-level bureaucratic corruption” (Soreide, 
2006c). This shows the importance of discussing the “definitional and methodological 
differences among data sources that may account in large part for the apparently 
conflicting messages they often provide” (Knack, 2006). 
However, as in any scientific field, for a better understanding of corruption we 
need to be able to estimate it and have alternative methods of measuring its quantity 
and consequences. In order to improve our anti-corruption strategies, we need to be 
able to estimate the impact of anti-corruption initiatives that have been introduced. 
For example, “when it comes to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, there have been few 
court cases of cross-border corruption since its implementation, and the effect of the 
reform has been difficult to determine” (Soreide, 2006c).  
It is likely that we will never be able to determine the exact amount of 
corruption or to be able to rank countries accurately. However, this should not 
discourage us, “but rather encourage continued critical debate about presentation and 
methodological improvements” (Soreide, 2006c). To achieve this, we emphasize “the 
need for scaling up data initiatives to fill significant gaps between our conceptual 
definitions of corruption and the operational definition embodied in the existing 





Corruption measurement methodologies 
To quantify a measure of corruption, one first needs to identify a definition of 
corruption which is both plausible and functional. Second, as corruption is a non-
observed phenomenon the scholar needs to find proxies which would estimate 
corruption in an acceptable level based on the chosen definition. And finally, the 
scholar needs to devise a data collection methodology based on the chosen proxy 
which can provide an estimated measure for the type of corruption the researcher 
aims to quantify. 
Different scholars have categorized and studied corruption quantification 
methodologies in a few different manners (Kenny, 2006; Lambsdorff, 2006; Reinikka 
& Svensson, 2003; Seldadyo & Haan, 2006; Soreide, 2006c; The Hungarian Gallup 
Institute, 1999; UNDP & Global Integrity, 2008; Weber Abramo, 2005).  All of these 
different measures have been reviewed and this paper categorizes them into four basic 
approaches of corruption measurement. This paper presents each approach with its 
strengths, weakness, and available examples. At the end, this paper presents the 
methodology it has chosen to construct the corruption index that it has introduced in 
this paper.  
 
Anecdotal and case by case method 
While there is regular coverage of corruption in the news, frequent journalistic 
accounts of corruption cases, and numerous personal stories of people who have 




this anecdotal information. The anecdotal method includes specific case studies of 
corrupt activities in a particular time and in a specific sector of one country.  
 
Strengths 
The papers using this method tend to be focused on a specific situation, 
covering it in detail with a high level of contextual information. The papers’ strength 
is that they tend to be more accurate in their estimation of corruption than other 
methods, even to a level useful in forensic analysis. With their focus on the details of 
the context, they provide excellent sources for case studies and for understanding the 
behaviors involving corruption. 
 
Weakness, lack of comparability 
The main challenge academic papers written using  this method face is the 
lack of comparability, as due to their narrow focus these would not provide a proper 
source for comparative studies (Seldadyo & Haan, 2006). As they delve deep into a 




Olken’s research in Indonesia is a good example of this approach, where he 
measured the discrepancies between officially declared project costs and the costs 
estimated by independent engineers for over 600 Indonesian village road projects 




their likelihood for being involved in corruption, cited above in the literature review 
section of this paper. (Svensson, 2003) 
 
General or target-group perception-based method 
Papers and indices produced utilizing the general or target-group perception-
based method reflects the perception of corruption held by the public or a specific 
group of respondents. The surveys relying on collecting the data from a specific 
group of respondents are usually called “expert surveys” and may include a diverse 
group including academics, lawyers, journalists, etc.  In a typical form of this method 
respondents would answer such a question as “How corrupt do you think country X 
has been in the past year on a ten-point scale, ten being the most corrupt?” This 
method by nature is subjective and is an indirect measure of the actual level of 
corruption based on perceptions.  
 
Strengths 
As the meaning of corruption has relied on the perception of the respondent, 
the researcher would not get involved in defining corruption. This makes using the 
perception-based method relatively easier to collect and compare over time and 
across different countries. In addition, due to their generality, they estimate corruption 
in an aggregate form which offers us a snapshot of corruption if needed. Measuring 
perceptions of corruption, instead of the actual level of corruption, is “meant to be a 
best possible solution to get indications of true levels of corruption in a situation with 




As a result of the mentioned strengths, these indices are widely used by 
media, donors, governments, and even academia as a measure for corruption. They 
are also used in political contexts by pressuring politicians regarding the rank of the 
country in the corruption indices compared to other countries. 
Many of the indicators in this category have a wide conceptual breadth with a 
multidimensional perspective of corruption as they are estimating the general 
perceptions about corruption and not a specific type of corruption. In some research 
contexts this might be what is needed since there is not enough corruption data 
available disaggregating the negative effects of corruption by type. 
 
Weaknesses 
These indicators have been largely criticized and cautioned against misuse by 
academics (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Galtung, 2005; Kenny, 2006; Knack, 2006; Sik, 
2002; Soreide, 2006c; The Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999; UNDP & Global 
Integrity, 2008; Weber Abramo, 2005) and even the developers of the indices 
themselves (Transparency International, 2008b).  
Galtung (2005) has provided a detailed list of criticisms: “1: Only Punishing 
the Takers, not the Givers or Abetters; 2: Irregular and Uncontrolled Country 
Coverage; 3: Biased Sample: More Than 90% of the World is Missing; 4: Imprecise 
and Sometimes Ignorant Sources; 5: Far Too Narrow and Imprecise a Definition of 
Corruption; 6: Does not Measure Trends: Cannot Reward Genuine Reformers! 7; 




The criticisms in the literature include a long list, many of them focusing on 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as it was one of the 
earliest examples of such indices “first published in 1995” (Soreide, 2006c) and it has 
been widely cited by both academics and media.  
 
Below is a summary of these weaknesses; 
1. Perception of corruption vs. the real level of corruption 
The usage of “perception of corruption” and the consequences of utilizing it as 
a proxy for “the real level of corruption” has been regularly criticized. These surveys 
intentionally do not provide respondents with explicit definitions and they would ask 
respondents to quantify “the misuse of public office for private or political party 
gain” and to rate “the severity of corruption within the state”. Utilizing perception 
basically means asking for “people's subjective intuition of the extent of something 
unobservable” (Soreide, 2006c) in which it is not clear what this unobservable 
phenomenon is from each respondents’ point of view. 
 
2. Potential for systematic bias 
Perceptions can be systematically biased, for example they can be affected in 
large parts by media coverage and the “actual events surrounding the data collection 
can significantly influence the results we get” (The Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999), 
whereas regular media coverage of corruption might inform us more on the extent of 
freedom of speech or political intergroup power plays in the country or on a specific 




interested in scandalizing the problem, or it may be controlled by the state” (Soreide, 
2006c).  
 
3. Ordinal vs. interval variable 
There is an important quantitative aspect about the nature of the data obtained 
from most perception-based corruption measurements. When respondents are asked 
to estimate the corruption on a Likert or other rating scales, the important quantitative 
question would be whether the gathered data is ordinal or interval.  
In most cases, they should be considered as ordinal data, because researcher 
could not simply assume that the respondents perceived all pairs of adjacent levels of 
their response scale as equidistant. This means that the numbers indicate the relative 
position of corruption and not the magnitude of their difference. For example, a 
questionnaire could ask the respondents to estimate the amount of overall corruption 
they perceive country X has on a scale of 1 to 10. Here a score of 8 means more 
perceived corruption than a score of 6. However, in the view of all respondents, the 
difference between scores 8 and 6 may not necessarily be the same as that between 
scores 5 and 3. This is an important distinction as many of the statistical and 
regression analysis methods are not readily useable in ordinal data. 
To account for this problem, the wording of response levels could be selected 
in a fashion which would imply symmetry of response levels about a middle category, 
and the questionnaire could be accompanied by a visual analog scale, which clearly 
shows the equal spacing of response levels. While these measures might make the 




this is still a matter of quantitative concern about the usage of the resulted indices in 
simple regression analysis without proper justification and considerations. 
The issue becomes even more clear when dealing with aggregate indices like 
Transparency International CPI and World Bank Institute Governance Indicators in 
which “the relation between numbers on the [perception-based corruption] ranking is 
unclear, and the ranking must be considered ordinal” (Soreide, 2006c). In such 
indices where countries are ranked based on their perceived corruption level, a 
ranking of 6 does not necessarily mean that the country in question has twice the 
amount of corruption compared to a country with a ranking of 3. As an ordinal 
variable, this difference only means that one country has more corruption than the 
other. 
 
4. Instinctively based on comparison 
As the name indicates, perception-based surveys rely on people's perceptions 
in giving an estimate for the corruption. However, people’s perceptions are 
“instinctively based on comparison”, which raises the question, what is the point of 
comparison for each respondent? Is it the neighboring country, the last heard rumor, 
the respondent’s personal values, the ideal situation respondent can imagine for that 
country, the situation of corruption in that country in last year, or other.? If this is not 
clearly mentioned to respondents in the questionnaire, respondents may hold very 
diverse points of comparison in their rating scale answers, making such surveys not 




Considering these diverse points of comparison, “while corruption must be 
expected to vary between state institutions, economic sectors and professions, we 
cannot expect respondents to describe the average level of corruption within the 
country in question” (Soreide, 2006a) and as a result we cannot claim perception-
based corruption indices to represent an indicator for this average.  
 
5. Petty vs. Grand Corruption 
When respondents are answering based on their perception, their perception 
would mostly be limited to their personal experience and what they have heard from 
friends and the media. This would potentially introduce a level of “tunnel vision 
syndrome”, as for example when asked the perception of households; the respondent 
would potentially base their response on their limited experience which is mainly of 
the corruption in daily life such as petty corruption they face in their daily dealings. 
This weakness was shown in research by Kenny (2006) where he concluded 
that “there is considerable evidence that most existing perceptions measures appear to 
be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector, 
largely (but inaccurately) measuring Petty rather than Grand Corruption.”(Kenny, 
2006) 
 
6. Inconsistency in data collection and measurement methodologies 
The underlying data in aggregate indices have not necessarily been collected 




accuracy of the researchers which use these indices on a time series or panel data 
analysis.  
The Transparency International CPI developers mentioned several times that 
“year-to-year changes in a country's score can either result from a changed perception 
of a country's performance or from a change in the CPI’s sample and methodology. 
The only reliable way to compare a country’s score over time is to go back to 
individual survey sources, each of which can reflect a change in assessment” 
(Transparency International, 2008b).  
 
7. Automatic correlation, spillover effect, and informational cascade 
Another significant weakness is with automatic correlation and spillover 
effects (Soreide, 2006c). Many of the “expert” respondents already are aware of the 
level of corruption published in the previous year of the index they are being 
interviewed for, and the most recent index would automatically be highly correlated 
with the previous years’ indices.  
This issue could be further explained by the “informational cascade” theory. 
As Bikhchandani et al. (1992) show “when it is optimal for an individual, having 
observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding 
individual without regard to his own information”. They argue that “localized 
conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by 
informational cascades” (Bikhchandani, et al., 1992). 
Andvig (2004) describes the informational cascades in this context: “The 




assessments are often not based on individual experience, when expert X claims 
corruption in A is very high, expert Z has no clear evidence to the contrary, so when 
knowing X´s statement it may be optimal to make an assessment close to his. 
Informational cascades may easily develop in this context. The fact that the TI index 
in particular is widely published, reinforces the argument” (Andvig, 2004). 
 
8. Independence of stochastic errors across sub-indicators 
In the aggregated indices like Transparency International CPI and World Bank 
Institute Governance Indicators, there is an important assumption that the stochastic 
errors across the sub-indicators of their indices are independent. Considering how 
respondents develop their perceptions of corruption, this assumption might not 
necessarily be correct “as the different underlying surveys seldom ask for each 
individual respondent's own experience, but rather their general impression of the 
problem” (Soreide, 2006c). This could potentially result in responses being 
influenced by the same error.  
The mentioned assumption that all these sources are independent from each 
other has not yet been substantiated by researchers; however, the aggregate rankings 
are still made assuming that the margins of error are uncorrelated. While Weber 
Abramo (2005) has offered some evidence for this type of bias among the subjective 
variables, there is more work needed studying this assumption and the extent of 






Aggregate vs. non-aggregate perception-based indices 
Some indices in this category are composite and aggregate of other indicators. 
This means they have compiled a number of perception-based surveys into one 
ranking by some averaging methodology and are in result an “index of indices”.  
While aggregation has the advantage of reducing potential errors from single 
sources, however “depending on one's purpose, it may be more appropriate to use 
data from a single source rather than a composite index because of the loss of 
conceptual precision in aggregation” (Knack, 2006). Even the statistical accuracy 
advantages supposedly resulting from aggregating sources of corruption data have 
been questioned as being “likely far more modest than often claimed because of 
interdependence among data sources” (Knack, 2006). 
 
Examples of aggregate perception-based indices 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and World Bank 
Institute Governance Indicators are the two most cited examples for this approach. 
The two are not very different from each other as “several of the sources are the 
same, and the two indices correlate well” (Soreide, 2006c).  
Their main differences are that the World Bank Institute Governance 
Indicators has a broader goal of presenting estimation for Governance and has 
corruption as a sub category. In addition, World Bank Institute Governance Indicators 
focuses on calculating the statistical errors produced by aggregating the individual 




number of papers published using this type of data, for example (Fisman & Gatti, 
2002). 
 
Examples of non-aggregate perception-based indices 
Aside from Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and 
World Bank Institute Governance Indicators, there are few other indices that could be 
fit in this category including Freedom House’s Nations in Transit (NIT) which has a 
sub-category for corruption and the Political Risk Service’s International Country 
Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG) 
The main difference from Transparency International CPI is that they are not 
aggregate indices of different surveys. Both NIT and ICRG are expert-driven 
perception-based indices which have the advantage of being consistent over the years 
as the pool of experts grading countries has been claimed to have been kept relatively 
constant (Howell, 2011; Walker, 2011). Their main strength relies on this consistency 
over time, making them more suitable for time series analysis than aggregate 
indicators like CPI. 
However, they have the downside of being just the views of few experts 
where their “final ratings are determined centrally by a very small number of 
people”(Knack, 2006), without full transparency on who they are and how they have 
arrived at the corruption measures they assign to each country each year.  
Numerous scholarly research papers have been published utilizing this type of 
data, a list of which can be found in Lamdsdorff (2006) and (Amundsen & Fjeldstad, 




taken with a grain of skepticism, as this variable does not depict corruption itself but 
the political instability that increases with corruption but also with the public’s 
intolerance towards corruption. In this regard, instability is assumed to increase with 
the time a government has been in power continuously – a theoretical assumption that 
not all observers are willing to follow” (Lambsdorff, 2006). 
Considering the abovementioned weaknesses in this corruption measurement 
method, the quality of the outcome of research using “general or target-group 
perception data” is of concern and “the extent to which we can rely on the 
conclusions is uncertain when the underlying information is weak” (Soreide, 2006c). 
 
Rule-based or de-jure method 
While perception-based indices focus on the perception of people on ‘how 
things work in reality’, rule-based assessments focus on the laws on paper and the 
formal institutional environment. This is why they are called “de-jure” in comparison 




The central defining characteristic of this method is that its data are based on 
actual laws and institutional regulations. For example, country X either has an anti-
money laundering regulation or it does not and the data could be collected 
objectively. As a result, this method does not rely on the perception of respondents 




This eliminates the problems mentioned before resulting from perception of 
respondents. In addition, this data collection method could be highly consistent over 
time and across countries if the definition for each variable were clearly stated. 
 
Weaknesses 
An example of objective measures for corruption could be the number of 
actual court cases or police arrests related to corruption. However, the number of 
corruption court cases and police arrests might not necessarily be an ideal indicator as 
“the judicial system may not have the capacity to investigate and prosecute all the 
cases that emerge. In addition, the police force may lack the necessary independence, 
or may even be corrupt itself” (Soreide, 2006c). 
 
Example 
A good example for this type of measurement is the work done by The Global 
Integrity which “quantitatively assesses the opposite of corruption, that is, the access 
that citizens and businesses have to a country's government, their ability to monitor 
its behavior, and their ability to seek redress and advocate for improved governance” 
(The Global Integrity, 2010). 
 
Incidence of corrupt activities, experience-based or the proxy method 
The incidence-based approach is based on surveys by those who have 




bribery. In this method, the person’s actual experiences with corrupt practices in their 
specific and narrow field of work would be assessed. 
 
Strengths 
This method has some specific advantages compared to each of the 
abovementioned three methods. Compared to the anecdotal method this method 
would enable large scale data collection across different sectors and countries. 
Compared to the perception-based method this approach would potentially result in a 
less subjective estimate for corruption as it is asking about actual incidences rather 
than perceptions. And compared to the rule-based method, this approach enables us to 
collect data even for de facto questions. 
Numerous scholars who have reviewed different corruption quantification 
approaches have stated their preference for this approach to different degrees 
(Hellman, et al., 2000; Kenny, 2006; Knack, 2006; Sik, 2002; Soreide, 2006c). Sik 
(2002) takes a supportive view of this type of corruption measurement stating: “I 
argue against a corruption-perception method and for a corruption-proxy method” 
(Sik, 2002). He describes that the corruption-proxy method assumes that “one can 
reliably measure certain (less hidden) forms of corruption, and that the volume of this 
‘tangible’ subsample positively and strongly correlates with the general level of 
corruption” (Sik, 2002). 
A similar conclusion has been made by Soreide (2006c) stating “[…] business 




quantification of corruption locally, and also its implications and its geographical and 
sector-related variation” (Soreide, 2006c). 
As mentioned in the section on weaknesses of perception-based methods, 
perception-based surveys rely on people's perceptions which are “instinctively based 
on comparison”, and the question arises about the point of comparison for each 
respondent. An important advantage of the incidence-based method is that 
respondents have clear points of knowledge and comparison when answering the 
questionnaire. 
Experience-based surveys like World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) (World Bank, 1999-2009) and World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys (World Bank, 1999-2011) have a range of features ensuring a 
higher level of reliability and depth in their assessments. In particular, “questions are 
based on the direct experience of firms rather than subjective comparisons across 
countries. Where possible, numerical cardinal estimates of problems are used (such as 
share of annual revenue spent on bribes) as opposed to subjective assessments of the 
extent of the problem” (Hellman, et al., 2000). 
Another important advantage of this approach is that the changes over time in 
corruption levels as measured by these surveys can produce valid inferences as their 
survey questions and sample designs remain similar in the years of data collection, 








1. Not entirely free of perception 
This type of data is not purely “non-perception”, as to an extent it also 
includes a level of perception from respondents, for which a level of precaution is 
necessary while using the data. For example, in order to gain answers about the level 
of bribery businesses have experienced, the questions have to be phrased indirectly by 
asking respondents about the corruption faced by  “firms like yours”. Despite the 
precautions taken, this is not the same as reporting personal experience and may 
include a level of perception potentially influenced by “other agents’ communication 
of their perceptions” (Andvig, 2004).  
 
2. Targeted and not aggregate 
While this approach benefits greatly from being a targeted indicator for 
corruption and a strong estimator for the specific aspect of corruption it is measuring, 
it would not be as useful in the assessment of corruption as a general concept or for 
assessing other types of corruption other than what it is intended to measure.  
For example, the business bribery index which this paper utilizes would not be 
directly helpful when bribery occurs between politicians and bureaucrats or when 
public funds are illegally diverted. Also, many other types of conflicts of interest 
would not be easily captured by this approach, “for example equity stakes of public 






3. Shame-bias, lack of truthfulness, and the routine-bias 
As this mode of data collection is closer to the actual people potentially 
involved in corruption, the chances of non-response and lack of truthfulness 
increases. As a result, we are unable to “control the shame-bias and the routine-bias, 
that is, we will never know the exact ratio between actual corruption attempts and the 
reported number” (The Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999).  
To explore this more, we consider two countries with a large difference in 
their prevalence of corruption. In the case of a routine-bias, the business person in a 
more corruption-prone country may not even recognize or remember the number of 
times that he was involved with bribery. This is while the business person in a less 
corrupt environment may fully recall the number of cases of bribery she was involved 
with in the last five years.  
This problem could be mitigated by making the comparison in a time series 
format, as “the best cross-validity we can hypothesize is between several waves of the 
same research in the same country” (The Hungarian Gallup Institute, 1999). 
 
Examples 
Two strong examples for experience-based surveys are the World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) (World Bank, 
1999-2009) and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank, 1999-2011). Their 
data collection approach is covered with more details in the data section of this paper. 
However, there have been few concentrated efforts in producing the available data 




Business Bribery Index (BBI) 
A new “experience-based” index 
Having mentioned all of the downsides of different approaches for the 
quantification of corruption does not reduce the importance of the subject. It is likely 
that we will never find a perfect measurement for corruption but as Arndt et al. put it 
“the production and use of more transparent indicators would better serve both 
developing countries and external groups seeking to improve the quality of local 
governance” (Arndt & Oman, 2006). 
This paper is an attempt to introduce a new measure of estimating corruption 
with a specific focus on the amount of bribes businesses pay to the government. The 
Business Bribery Index (BBI) introduced in this paper is an example of the 
“experience-based” method in corruption quantification.  
BBI offers an estimation of national annual bribes paid by the business sector 
to governments in each country worldwide. BBI utilizes multiple surveys done in this 
regard, mainly the World Bank Enterprise Survey which has been surveying business 
owners worldwide for over 10 years. More discussion about the nature of data will be 
provided in the data section of this paper.  
 
Available bribery estimates  
BBI is the only index which estimates business bribery as a targeted form of 
corruption inside each country. The closest other index to BBI is Transparency 
International’s Bribe Payers Index which ranks 28 exporting countries by the 




Bribe Payers Survey. In this survey, “international business leaders reported the 
widespread practice of companies paying bribes to public officials in order to, for 
example, win public tenders, avoid regulation, speed up government processes or 
influence policy” (Transparency International, 2011a).  
Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index utilizes the “perception-
based” method in gathering data. Its key question is asking respondents “could you 
please tell us, using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means never and 5 means almost 
always, how often do firms headquartered in that country engage in bribery in this 
country?” (Transparency International, 2011a) 
 The key difference between BBI and Transparency International’s Bribe 
Payers Index is that BBI is focused on the business bribes paid inside the country by 
domestic businesses to their own government, while the Bribe Payers Index estimates 
the bribes paid by foreign multinational companies to local governments in order to 
secure contracts and sales. BBI is mostly about bribes paid for the ease of doing 
business locally while the Bribe Payers Index is about potential foreign actors’ effects 
on corruption in local business environments.  
Another publicly cited example for the estimation of bribery is the aggregate 
global amount suggested by Daniel Kaufmann (Kaufmann, 2005). This estimate was 
publicized for the first time through a news piece published in 2004 on the The World 
Bank website (World Bank Institute, 2004). Since then this estimation has received 
numerous media citations, however, it has not received the same level of attention in 
academic citations. Kaufmann has summarized that estimation as the following: “an 




puts it close to US$1 trillion. The margin of error of this estimate being obviously 
large, it may well be as low as US$600 billion; or, at the other extreme of the 
spectrum, it could well exceed US$1.5 trillion” (Kaufmann, 2005). 
 
Data 
Data sources for BBI 
The estimation presented in this paper is based on enterprise and business 
corruption surveys collected to enhance our understanding of the actual amount of 
corruption and bribery in the business sector of each country rather than the 
perceptions of the existence of such corrupt practices.  
The World Bank defines an Enterprise Survey as “a firm-level survey of a 
representative sample of an economy’s private sector” (World Bank, 2011c). These 
surveys include questions about personal direct experience of respondents with 
bribery and corruption such as the amount paid in bribes as a percentage of the total 
project the firm was contracted or the annual sale of the company. 
 
The main sources of information for BBI are two World Bank surveys listed 
below: 
1. World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS): 
 World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 




Development and the World Bank. The BEEPS has been carried out in three rounds 
in 1999, 2002, and 2005 and covers virtually all of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey. It includes detailed 
information such as bribes paid by a firm as a share of its annual sales and percent of 
annual sales used for protection payments. (World Bank, 1999-2009) 
The quality of data collection in BEEPS has been tested and cited by multiple 
academic papers and has generally received very positive reviews. For example, 
Hellman et al. (2000) tested the quality of BEEPS data and concluded that “cross-
country surveys may suffer from bias if firms tend to systematically over- or 
underestimate the extent of problems within their country. The authors provide a new 
test of this potential bias, finding little evidence of country perception bias in BEEPS” 
(Hellman, et al., 2000). 
 
2. The World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES): 
The World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) is one of The World Bank’s 
largest and longest surveys covering a broad spectrum of business climate topics 
including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, competition, and performance 
measures. The World Bank has collected this data from face-to-face interviews with 
top managers and business owners in over 130,000 companies in 125 economies 
(World Bank, 2009). 
The sample size in both BEEPS and WBES varies between 150-1,320 
business managers in each country depending on the size of the country. The data 




to-face interviews with business managers. The interviews are distributed as 71,789 
between the years 2002 and 2005, and 60,838 interviews between the years 2006 and 
2011. 
The main question utilized in creating BBI to which respondents answered 
(same in all countries and over the years) in these surveys is: 
“We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or 
informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, 
taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual 
sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal 
payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?” (World Bank, 1999-2009, 
1999-2011) 
 
Data sources used as a BBI validation set 
The following two enterprise surveys have been utilized as a quality check 
measure for the BBI data as they are both asked in an experience-based method from 
business managers. The reason they are not directly included in BBI is their lack of 
comparability for direct inclusion, however, they are useful as a validation set for 
BBI. 
 
1. World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey 
The Global Competitiveness Survey is an annual international survey 




emerging economies drawing from its survey of about 9,000 respondents from the 
business community (in 2004 it included 8,729 firm responses) (Schwab, 2011).  
Related to BBI, The Global Competitiveness Survey includes a measure of 
bribery under its institutions pillar. This is a measure of the extent of bribery and 
irregular payments derived from the Executive Opinion Survey which has been added 
under ethics and corruption in the index. The typical question asked related to BBI is: 
“When firms like yours do business with the government, how much of the contract 
value must they offer in additional payments to secure the contract?” (World Bank 
Institute, 2006) 
 
2. IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
The World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) is an annual business 
competitiveness ranking published by the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) analyzing how “nations and enterprises manage the totality of 
their competencies to achieve increased prosperity” (International Institute for 
Management Development, 2011a). World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) covers 
59 countries using 331 variables from a variety of data sources. 
Among its 331 variables under the Government efficiency/State Efficiency 
section, it includes a variable called “Bribing and corruption” defined as whether 
“Bribing and corruption do not exist”. The data for this variable is from the IMD 
survey and can be used as a check and balance component for BBI. The survey 









BBI map  
The depth of data used in creating BBI enables it to be both an aggregate 
panel data on bribery and corruption of countries over time and across countries, and 
a disaggregated source of bribery data for a particular country, in a specific year, in a 
certain sector of business (i.e., manufacturing, agriculture, or service), and for a 
specific business size (i.e., small, medium, and large businesses).  
For example, BBI can answer what the “going rate” for business bribes were 
in Argentina in 2006 in $US, and it can answer what the “going rate” for business 




















Figure 2. Business Bribery Index, 2008 
 
Darker color indicates more bribery reported. 
Colors range from dark red to lighter red each indicates 20 percentiles. 
 
 
Empirical analysis of the BBI  
While BBI benefits considerably from the high quality of its data sources, to 
ensure the reliability and relevancy of BBI for research, a number of tests have been 
conducted on BBI. Below a battery of tests and a list of such variables and their 










Table 6. Variables Involved in the Empirical Analysis of BBI 
Variable 
name Description Source 
BBI 
Business Bribery Index (BBI), in US dollars, weighted 
by average annual sale of businesses in the country-
year 
Farmanesh (2011), 




Control of Corruption, World Bank Governance 
Indicator The World Bank 
GDP GDP per capita The World Bank 
CPI Corruption Perception Index Transparency Intl. 
Freedom 
House FH Liberal Democracy Index, standardized Freedom House 
Polity IV Polity IV Constitutional Democracy, standardized GMU-UMD 
 
The table below summarizes the above mentioned tests in one table. It 
includes a correlation matrix between BBI and the abovementioned variables, a 
regression analysis to study the relationship between the variables, a Levene's test and 
an unpaired ttest to compare BBI with these variables.  
The correlation matrix indicates a clear lack of correlation between BBI and 
other indices. The regression results also present the same conclusion that the 
variables are not significant in any of the chosen significance levels and the signs of 
the coefficients confirm the assumptions of the model as BBI being negatively 
defined compared with CPI and WB corruption. For example, in CPI higher numbers 
show lower corruption while in BBI higher numbers show a higher amount of bribe 
paid, hence we expected the coefficient to be negative. Finally, Levene's test and 
unpaired ttest to compare BBI with other indices presents significant difference 




In general, it could be concluded that BBI is not a copy or proxy for other 
indices tested here. BBI shows distinct data not available through other indices and 
not duplicable using transformation of those indices. 
 
Table 7. Empirical Analysis of the BBI,  





-0.00327 -3.14E-03       -0.1071 
0.269 0.293       





07  -8.11e-07  -0.1433 
 0.165  0.063* 0.239  0.340  
WB Corrupt   
-3.99E-
04 1.45E-02   -0.0137 
  0.952 0.174   
Freedom 
House     
.0001073  -0.4184 
    0.652  
Polity IV      .0000588  -0.3298  
     0.782 
Constant 
  
0.046465 5.31E-02 0.033746 0.051269 .0327393 
 
.0370012  
0*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0.029**  0.016**  
        
Levene's test 
0.0005  0.0022  0 0  
0***  0***  0*** 0***  
ttest 
unpaired 
-62.8912  2.3253  -90.3663 -63.6839  
0***  0.0202**  0*** 0***  
P-values are reported in the second row of each regression result. 






Empirical analysis of the validity of BBI 
As shown in the previous section, BBI is significantly different from other 
available measurements of corruption. However, this does not necessarily indicate 
that BBI is in fact useful in describing the real world. To test for the validity of BBI a 
second series of empirical tests has been performed which has a real world and 
objective variable as its dependent variable and includes BBI as an independent 
variable along other variables.  
Below is a description of the variables included: 
 
Table 8. Variables Involved in the test of BBI validity 
Variable 
name Description Source 
Registered 
Business* Total businesses registered (number) per urban capita World Bank 
WB 
Corruption 
Control of Corruption, World Bank Governance 
Indicator The World Bank 
GDP GDP per capita The World Bank 
CPI Corruption Perception Index Transparency Intl. 
Credit to 
Private Domestic credit available to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank 
Mar Corp 
Tax Highest marginal corporate tax rate (%) World Bank 
* Registered business data are collected directly from the Registrar of Companies, 
which is the entry point for businesses joining or transitioning to the formal sector. 
This is discussed in details in the “Enabling environments, Policy variables affecting 
the growth of the formal business sector” paper. 
 
Using the mentioned variables, the following quantitative analysis has been 




model. Utilizing the panel data the quality of the econometrics analysis would be 
significantly enhanced as with “the combination of time series with cross-sections can 
enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only 
one of these two dimensions” (Gujarati, 2003) In addition, panel data enables to 
control for unobserved variables or factors which are known but are impossible to 
quantify “like cultural factors or difference in business practices across companies; or 
variables that change over time but not across entities (i.e. national policies, federal 
regulations, international agreements, etc.). This is, it accounts for individual 
heterogeneity” (Baltagi, 2005). 
In the results, as R-squared of xtreg (random effects) does not have all the 
properties of the OLS R-squared, here R-squared is reported using OLS with year 
dummies. As shown below, BBI is highly significant in describing the number of 














 Table 9. Test of BBI validity 
 
P-values are reported in the second row of each regression result. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
BBI and the next steps 
BBI is in its first steps and has a long list of further progress needed to 
increase its quality.  
 
1. More disaggregated 
BBI and its underlying data have the potential to become more disaggregated. 
The disaggregation would be based on the following: 
BBI could be presented disaggregated by the characteristics of the firms like 
their sector and size. For example, the average bribe paid by medium size businesses 




BBI could also be disaggregated by the characteristics of the firm managers 
like their gender and education. For example, the average bribe paid by large firms 
managed by well-educated executives in Argentina could be estimated by BBI and 
could be compared based on the gender or education of the executives. 
BBI could also be disaggregated by the characteristics of the business 
environment in the specific year like their annual sales and corporate tax rates. For 
example, the average bribe paid by firms in high taxed countries could be studied 
compared to lower taxed business environments. 
 
2. Sister indices 
BBI could be enhanced by the development of its sister indices such as 
Household Bribery Index (HBI) for which the data for 40 countries is already 
collected. BBI and HBI together could result in an estimation of the annual 
worldwide bribery disaggregated by the country-year. 
 
3. More detailed study 
BBI could be enhanced by a more detailed study of “non-respondents” and the 
“margins of error”. While respondents have the option of answering that “no bribe” is 
paid in their business, some decide not to respond to such questions. This type of 
response could be further studied based on its characteristics to enhance our 
understanding of underlying corrupt behaviors. 
Furthermore, the responses claiming that no bribe is being paid in their line of 




have answered “no bribe is being paid by people in this sector”, which depending on 
the sector could be a questionable response. A further study in the nature of such 
responses could be helpful to enhance BBI. 
Causes and effects of business bribery by region-countries-year-specific 
situation and studying their association with social, political, and economic factors 
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The spatial relation between economic agents is an important determinant of 
how they interact, what they do, and how well off they are. Based on NEG theories, 
economic activities and interactions fall off rapidly with distance, and production 
structures are shaped both by factor endowments and by distance to markets and 
sources of supply. In recent years a number of theoretical tools have been developed 
to address the role of geography in shaping these relationships. There is also a newly 
developing body of empirical work, based mainly on cross-country and sub-national 
studies. This is now being supplemented by empirical work which is being developed 
by recent developments in theory using international as well as sub-national data.  
This paper studies the spatial distribution of economic activity in the Iranian 
provinces and the strength of product-market linkages between them. It presents a 
spatial analysis on regional dimensions of poverty and economic development across 
28 provinces of Iran. As far as the author of this paper found, this paper is the first 
estimation made in any developing country using this strand of “New Economic 
Geography” (NEG) models. 
The goal of this study is to offer an analysis of the effects of agglomeration 




It analyzes the linkages among adjacent provinces as well as effects of agglomeration 
and dispersion economies on the patterns of Iran’s regional economic development 
through empirical estimation of two NEG models.  
NEG models are based on the idea that the level of market access to goods is 
an imperative condition for the scale of economic activity in any location. They 
emphasize the importance of the market access characteristics compared to the set 
characters of a location. This approach presents an alternative approach in 
characterizing the economy of scale and the geographic agglomeration of economic 
activities. 
The effects of physical location and distance on the economic situation have 
long been studied. The Neo-Classical Theory (NCT) takes location as exogenous and 
explains agglomeration derived from endowment and/or technology. The introduction 
of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and consumers’ preference in the 
variety of goods were the New Trade Theory (NTT) improvements which all were the 
basis for the development of NEG theory.  
Overman et al. (Overman, Redding, & Venables, 2003) mentions the 
differentiation between first- and second-nature geography and their important roles 
as determinants of trade, income and production structure. The first-nature is defined 
as the physical geography of coasts, mountains, and endowments of natural resources, 
while second-nature is defined as the distance between economic agents. With this 
definition, first-nature elements are the main subject of factor endowment based trade 




are concerned with how the spatial relationship between economic agents determines 
their interaction, what they do, and how well off they are? 
NEG theories combine the above mentioned aspects with the new feature of 
“agglomeration” effects which endogenously arise for some parameter values. NEG 
theories take location as endogenous and assume labor mobility. The models suggest 
higher wages at the centre of production and lower wages on the periphery. They 
predict that the access of a location to markets for its goods determines its level of 
economic activity. Therefore, less proximity to consumer markets would result in 
higher economic activity, which in turn increases the level of employment and wages. 
NEG predicts that with higher economies of scale, agglomeration would 
increase as economies of scale encourage firms to concentrate their production in few 
locations to utilize scale gains. Also lower trade costs allow firms to supply even the 
markets that are far from one central location, this in turn would increase 
agglomeration as predicted by NEG. NEG also predicts stronger agglomeration if 
demand patterns are biased for industrial and manufactured goods as they support 
larger agglomerations of firms. 
 
Harris (Harris, 1954) presents the idea which later NEG models used. It 
proposes that, weighted by transportation costs, the demand for produced goods in a 
specific location is the total of purchasing power in other locations. Krugman’s 
(Krugman, 1991) paper re-initiated mainstream economics interest in the spatial 
distribution of economic activity. It uses the interaction of firm-level economies of 




Hummels (Hummels, 1999) studied the relationship between per capita income and 
market access and showed the high correlation between residuals from the augmented 
Solow growth model with measures of geographical location. 
Fujita et al. (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999) showed that spatial demand 
linkages are created by a combination of transportation cost and scale economies 
contributing to agglomeration. The possibility of serving large local markets draws 
firms to cities, however costs related to congestion limit the geographic 
concentration. Fujita et al. (Fujita, et al., 1999) by deriving the Harris (Harris, 1954) 
“Market Potential Function” (MPF) from formal spatial models revived its concept. 
Modern forms of MPF show that near consumer and industrial agglomerations 
nominal wages are higher. 
The determinant characteristics of firm size have been studied separately 
through different approaches. For example, Axtell (Axtell, 2001) showed that Zipf 
distribution characterizes firm sizes and that some large firms pay higher wages for 
the same job. Connecting this to NEG insights about the interplay between distance, 
agglomeration and wages, we can study factors effecting wage inequality in different 
regions. 
Distance and geographical location affect wages and income through 
influence on the flow of production factors, goods, and ideas. There are different 
mechanisms to determine the influence of distance. On the one hand is a province’s 
distance from the markets buying their output, and on the other hand is the distance 
from provinces supplying their needs, providing the necessary capital and 




transport costs and other trade barriers. This means that provinces further from 
markets would effectively pay a tax or penalty on their sales and imports. As a result, 
firms in these provinces would pay lower wages than others with better access, even 
if other factors like technology are similar. 
The potential impact of these effects has been empirically estimated at country 
level. Hummels (Hummels, 1999) used customs data to show that while the average 
expenditure on freight and insurance as a proportion of the value of manufacturing 
imports is 10.3% in the US, it is 17.7% in Brazil. Limao and Venables (Limao & 
Venables, 2001) showed that the shipping costs of a median land-locked country are 
more than 50% higher than those of the median coastal country. As Redding and 
Venables (Redding & Venables, 2004) mention, these papers narrowly define 
transportation costs as pure costs of freight and insurance, this may result in possible 
understatement of the real scale of trade barriers as the cost of distance could possibly 
be higher due to the costs of transit time or information gathering. 
Head and Mayer (Head & Mayer, 2004), Overman et al. (Overman, et al., 
2003), Redding and Venables (Redding & Venables, 2004), and Garcia Pires (Garcia 
Pires, 2006) offer comprehensive surveys of the increasing number of empirical 
studies published on NEG models in the last strand. An important problem of NEG 
empirical research is the unobserved variables that affect spatial agglomeration 
besides market access and distance. For example, workers could come to a province 
based on factors like family needs or weather choice (Roback, 1982). However, some 
researchers like Redding and Venables (Redding & Venables, 2004) and Garcia Pires 




variables made no significant change in their results. Regardless, this paper addresses 
issues of unobserved variables through the interpretations in the text. 
Neary (Neary, 2001) and Brakman et al. (Brakman, Garretsen, & Schramm, 
2004) in a review of NEG empirical works conclude that empirical research is 
lagging behind NEG theory and that much more empirical validation of NEG 
theoretical insights is necessary. The reason given for the lag of empirical research is 
that the NEG models characteristics which are nonlinear and use multiple equilibria. 
As mentioned in this paper and other empirical NEG works this makes empirical 
validation relatively difficult and less accurate. 
Hanson (Hanson, 2005) categorizes published NEG empirical research into 
three strands. The first strand is based on Krugman’s (Krugman, 1980) home-market 
effect and the New Trade Theory (NTT) which studies the determinants of production 
concentration close to large national or regional markets. The second strand is 
consistent with Eaton and Kortum (Eaton & Kortum, 1999, 2002) which focuses on 
the diffusion of technology across space and its effects on trade and industry location. 
The third strand is what Hanson (Hanson, 1998, 2005), Redding and Venables 
(Redding & Venables, 2004), Head and Mayer (Head & Mayer, 2004), Garcia Pires 
(Garcia Pires, 2006), and this paper are close to. Based on NEG models, they study 
whether wage/income is higher in countries/provinces with better access to larger 
markets for their goods. 
This paper first presents Harris (Harris, 1954) estimation of an MPF model in 
which wages are associated with proximity to consumer markets. The MPF model 




account the barriers of distance, the “market potential” is the total amount of trade 
between all regions that might take place.  By assuming that wages would be 
proportional to the market potential, we can study whether trade in Iran is subject to 
the distance barrier or not.  
Second, the paper estimates an augmented market-potential function derived 
from the Krugman (Krugman, 1991) model of economic geography. The parameters 
in this model estimate the importance of transportation costs and scale economies. 
The Krugman model offers insight into economies of scale and describes the benefits 
that firms and industries gain by locating near each other. Based on the idea of 
economies of scale, as more similar firms cluster together, there would be more 
competing suppliers, greater specialization and division of labor. These factors 
decrease the cost of production and increase the markets for firms. 
Krugman (Krugman, 1991), by studying the relation between agglomeration, 
increasing returns and market access, endogenously determines wages in a province 
as a function of wages and income in other provinces. He tests the spatial distribution 
of economic activity through the estimation of several structural parameters including 
elasticity of substitution, trade costs and share of income spent on industrial and 
manufactured goods. 
The structural estimation used in this paper is similar to what Hanson 
(Hanson, 1998, 2005) offered for the first time for the United States. Later empirical 
studies were done similar to Hanson’s (Hanson, 1998, 2005) in other developed 
countries. Roos (Roos, 2001) offers an estimation for Western Germany, De Bruyne 




Mion (Mion, 2004) for Italy, and Paluzie et al. (Paluzie Hernandez, Pons Novell, & 
Tirado Fabregat, 2005) and Garcia Pires (Garcia Pires, 2006) for Spain. The results of 
these studies have been compared with the results of this study later in the paper.  
While this paper and Garcia Pires (2006) use Krugman (1993), the multi-
region version of the Krugman (1991), the other papers noted above use Helpman’s 
(1998) variant of the Krugman (1991) econometric formalization. Krugman (1991) 
assumes that a perfect competitive sector produces a homogeneous good like 
agriculture which is traded freely. While Helpman (1998) takes the homogeneous 
good as a non-tradable good like housing. Considering the higher housing price in 
more populated provinces, an extra centrifugal force is introduced. As a result, the 
two models have differences in the impact of a trade cost reduction as Helpman 
(1998) would predict promotion of dispersion but Krugman (1991) would predict 
promoted agglomeration. 
Puga (1999) has shown that the Krugman (1991) and Helpman (1998) models 
are not necessarily different but that they are two sides of the relationship between 
regional inequality and transportation costs. Through this bell-shaped curve Helpman 
(1998) predicts more dispersion in the case of a reduction from low trade costs, while 
Krugman (1991) predicts an increase in agglomeration in the case of a reduction from 
high trade costs. As mentioned most empirical works have chosen Helpman’s (1998) 
model over Krugman’s (1991) as they see Helpman (1998) predicting less extreme 
spatial patterns than Krugman (1991). However, Garcia Pires (2006) has shown that 




configuration of space; Krugman’s (1993) model is generalized to multiple regions 
which makes it suitable for empirical estimation. 
Previous empirical studies have focused mostly on NEG estimations in the 
developed countries. In general, it is appealing to empirically study these models in 
diverse countries and economies, especially to offer estimations for developing 
countries versus current estimations for developed countries and study the potentially 
consistent differences. In particular, considering diversity, mountainous geography, 
and regional cultures of provinces in Iran, Iran can be an interesting case study for 
testing NEG models.  
A major advantage of this study for Iran is the nature of trade in Iran. NEG 
models assume a closed economic framework to be able to simplify the factors. This 
assumption is much more accurate for the nature of trade in Iran in comparison to 
trade in Europe and America, where the available empirical literature of this model 
exists. While some other developing countries also fit better in this assumption of a 
closed economy than developed countries, but Iran, in result of political factors and 
trade sanctions, would be an even better case to study. 
The estimation results suggest that Iran showed generally good fit to both 
models and satisfied both MPF and Krugman model specifications. Compared to 
other similar studies in developed countries, Iran shows smaller returns to scale and 





Overview of regional diversity in Iran 
Iran with the eighteenth largest land mass and seventeenth largest population 
in the world is a country of great history and diversity. For a more effective 
management of this wide country, Iran is currently subdivided into provincial 
divisions, which are called استان (ostān) in Persian, and in plural form استانها (ostānhā). 
The thirty current provinces or Ostans are each governed from their capital, which is 
usually the largest local city. Each capital is called the مرکز (markaz) of that province. 
Every province is headed by a Governor-General or اراستاند  (ostāndār), who is 
appointed by the Minister of the Interior subject to approval of the cabinet. 
The structure of provinces of Iran has changed a number of times in recent 
history. Until 1950, Iran was divided into twelve provinces: Ardalan, Azarbaijan, 
Baluchestan, Fars, Gilan, Araq-e Ajam, Khorasan, Khuzestan, Kerman, Larestan, 
Lorestan, and Mazandaran. In 1950, there was a reorganization to form ten provinces 
with subordinate governorates: Gilan, Mazandaran, East Azarbaijan, West 
Azarbaijan, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, and Isfahan. Between 
1960 and 1981, several governorates were raised to provincial status one by one, 
which has resulted in the creation of several new provinces. The most recent one was 
the division of Khorasan into three new provinces in 2004.  
Each province or Ostan is further subdivided into counties or شهرستان 
(shahrestān), and each shahrestan is then subdivided into districts or بخش (bakhsh). 
Each county usually consists of few cities or شهر (shahr) and some rural 
agglomerations or دهستان (dehestān) which are a collection of a number of villages. 




1383  (March 2005), Iran has 30 provinces, 324 counties, 865 districts, 982 
townships, and 2378 rural agglomerations.  
Due to the limited availability of data, this study covers the Iranian Calendar 
years of 1379-1382 (approximately 2000-2004) when Iran had 28 provinces. The only 
difference since then has been the split of province of Khorasan into three new 
provinces in 2004. Please refer to Table 10 for more information on provinces of Iran 




















Table 10. GRDP and population data of Iranian provinces for years of 1379, 
1380, 1381, and 1382 
 
 
Theory and Specifications 
Our methodology generally follows Garcia Pires (2006), unless mentioned 
specifically otherwise. Paper uses (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003) as the general 
for econometric references. The first model is a market potential function (MPF), 
which comes from a line of theory based on Harris (1954).  The second model is 
1382 1381 1380 1379 1382 1381 1380 1379 1382 1381 1380 1379
Country total 1198390 986269 745536 645256 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tehran  309426 255350 193374 155793 25.8 25.9 26 24.14 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.66
Khuzestan  161069 140840 96451 90133 13.4 14.3 13 13.97 6.3 6.9 6.8 6.66
Esfahan 75051 57653 45409 40195 6.3 5.8 6.1 6.23 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.55
Khorasan  73330 59928 47252 40238 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.2 9.6 9.2 9.4 9.6
Fars  54236 43227 32224 27371 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.24 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.33
E. Azarbayejan 45691 39378 30287 26363 3.8 4 4.1 4.09 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.28
Mazandaran  43483 35323 27541 22336 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.46 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.24
Kohgiluyeh 41546 36835 30731 32595 3.5 3.7 4.1 5.05 1 1 1 0.94
Bushehr  37459 15039 9501 7079 3.1 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.23
Kerman  29679 25310 20300 21011 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.26 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.36
Gilan  28078 23778 18548 16080 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.49 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.59
Markazi 27152 23370 19182 14725 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.28 2 2 2 2
W. Azarbayejan 24645 20453 16243 14495 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.25 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.21
Hormozgan  21970 17642 14630 11712 1.8 1.8 2 1.82 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.85
Kermanshah  17792 14356 10721 9000 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.39 2.9 3 3 2.99
Hamedan  18131 15800 11543 9364 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.45 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.68
Qazvin  17261 14216 12339 10558 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.64 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.62
Golestan  16847 14207 10465 9377 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.45 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.38
Lorestan  15274 12551 10466 8886 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.38 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.58
Yazd  14507 12140 9511 7545 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.17 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.27
Sistan 13191 11073 8740 7295 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.13 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.08
Ardebil 12492 10246 7884 6879 1 1 1.1 1.07 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.87
Qom  11779 10083 8136 6766 1 1 1.1 1.05 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.46
Kordestan  12118 9853 7203 6414 1 1 1 0.99 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.27
Zanjan  10532 8279 6315 5900 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.91 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.45
Semnan  9211 7187 5800 4819 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.75 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.85
Chaharmahal 7694 6184 4985 4066 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.63 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.23
Ilam  6294 7849 5667 3967 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.61 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.83
Supraregion 42457 38123 24087 24297 3.5 3.9 3.2 3.77 - - - -




based on the Krugman (1993) multi-region version of Krugman’s (1991) model.  
Since the economic theory underlying these models is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we simply discuss the salient features of the models and present them in an estimable 
form. 
The MPF model captures the idea that distance acts as a barrier to trade.  After 
taking into account the barriers of distance, the "market potential" is the total amount 
of trade between all regions that might take place.  By assuming that wages would be 
proportional to the market potential, using exponential decay as the functional form 
of the distance barrier to trade, and taking logs, we find Equation 1.  In Equation 1, θ 
is a scale parameter and α and β are the model parameters.  The income (GDP) of 
region j is Yj, wi is the wage of region i, and dij is the distance between regions i and 
j.   The only strict theoretical restrictions are that α and β should be positive, 
indicating that wage and market potential are positively related, and that trade drops 
off with distance, respectively.  Equation 1 is a standard empirical MPF in the 
literature.    











In the Krugman model, forces for the agglomeration and dispersion of 
economic activity act in concert to produce the observed economic geography.  The 
Krugman model considers a homogeneous and a differentiated good, which are often 
interpreted as agricultural and manufactured goods, respectively.   In the model, 
“peasants” are fixed in place while “workers” can move from one region to another.  
Workers, who are paid the marginal product of their work, are drawn together to 




by the downward wage pressures of increased competition.    We estimate a form of 
the Krugman model given in Equation 2, where θ is again a scale parameter, σ 
represents inverse economies of scale, μ is the fraction of income spent on 
manufactured goods, and τ is a trade cost index.  In addition, we report σ/(σ -1) and 
σ(1-μ ), because they have the interpretations of nationally increasing returns to scale 
in manufacturing and strong agglomeration forces. 




























One important econometric issue is that wages and GDP are jointly 
determined which could lead to endogenous variable biases.   To attempt to control 
for this, we estimate several different specifications.  In particular, we estimate time-
differenced versions of Equations 1 and 2, which are given in Equations 3 and 4, 
respectively. 






















































































































To avoid the potential issue of technological or other shocks that 
disproportionately hit the largest areas; we estimate the models with and without the 
provinces of Tehran and Khuzestan, which are the two regions with the highest Gross 




10 shows the significant difference between these two provinces and other provinces 
in the country. 
To estimate how goods move around the country, we use three different 
measures of distance: simple distance, ‘hub and spoke’ (HAS), and extreme hub and 
spoke.  In simple distance, the distance between any two provinces is simply the 
distance between the capital cities of each.  In hub and spoke distance, there are five 
“hub” provinces, selected based on their higher GRDP than other provinces and their 
central geographical location, between which all trades must pass (Table 11 and 
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Khuzestan  
Kohgiluyeh & Boyerahmad  
Kerman  
Hormozgan  
Sistan & Baluchestan 









That is, to trade between two outlying provinces, goods are transported from 
one Ostan to its hub, from that hub to the destination Ostan's hub, and on to the 
destination Ostan.  Finally, the extreme HAS distance supposes that all trade between 
outlying provinces passes through Tehran with the assumption that most storage and 




By seeing to what extent each of the distance measurements result in better 
empirical fits, we can learn something about trade patterns within Iran.  However, our 
ability to do this might be limited by the overall relevance of distance to trade.  To 
cope with this issue, Hanson (2005) uses a categorical variable for distance that takes 
only a few values.  Though we hope to gain policy insights by using more exact 
distance measures, the exact distance level may not directly matter. Apart from the 
mentioned econometric problems with endogenous variables and high nonlinear 
modeling, there is an additional problem with identification of the parameters. For 
example, in the MPF model, θ and α are not identified when β equals zero as well as 
β is not identified if α equals zero. 
 
Analysis and Results 
The distance data used in this study are provided by the ‘Iran National 
Cartographic Center’, all other data are provided by the ‘Statistical Center of Iran’. 












Figure 4. Spatial distribution of GRDPs, all Provinces - 1382 
 
 
To fit the data, we use GRDP (Figure 4) and non-farm wages (Figure 5) in 
units of effective farmer production, as well as the several distance measures 
discussed above.  Note that in addition to controlling for the difference in farm wages 
across Iran, using a relative unit of wages and income also might play as an automatic 





Figure 5. Spatial distribution of Urban Wages, all Provinces - 1382 
 
 
For time-differenced estimation, we difference each year and the previous 
year.  While differencing allows us to control for some persistence in wage 
differences, there are costs to differencing as well.  Instead of using the full cross-
sectional variation in wages and GDP, differencing limits itself to considering the 
effects on wages of a change in GDP.  It fails to take full advantage of the 
information in the magnitudes of wage and GDP for each period, thus wasting some 




information in the data, and since we have only data from 28 provinces per year, the 
benefit of controlling for persistence in wage shocks over time is at least partially 
offset by the loss in accuracy. 
Since Equations 1 to 4 are nonlinear, we use nonlinear least squares (NLS) to 
compute parameter estimates.  Since NLS estimation must be done by iteration, we 
chose the Gauss-Newton algorithm for optimization.  Because Gauss-Newton 
sometimes fails to converge, we tested over 1000 different starting parameter 
estimates for every combination of year, distance measure, set of provinces, and 
equation.   Considering the optimization effort made, the instance of failure to 
converge has been optimized to the best possible solution and has happened only in 
one year scenario. 
As shown in the final results (Table 12 and Table 13), the instances with a 
lack of convergence has happened only for one year in the case of extreme HAS 
analysis scenario. This instance might be interpreted as a sign of a poor fit between 
the model used in this specific scenario and our data. Alternatively, it could be due to 
a lack of identification as a result of inadequate information in the data to identify the 


























1379 1380 1381 1382
θ -6.1657* -7.0666* -5.1328* -8.0743*
(1.9725) (1.9718) (1.5706) (2.4129)
α 0.51312* 0.56285* 0.4545* 0.61997*
(0.1143) (0.1161) (0.0931) (0.1386)
β 0.0156 0.0219 0.0373 0.0127*
(0.0084) (0.0121) (0.0455) (0.0047)
R2 0.4558 0.5061 0.5438 0.5253
θ -5.4658* -7.2889* -5.5173* -6.2672*
(1.8272) (1.8964) (1.5209) (1.7947)
α 0.47538* 0.57347* 0.47748* 0.51988*
(0.1082) (0.1113) (0.0905) (0.1074)
β 0.0204 0.0103 0.0374 0.0213
(0.0166) (0.0054) (0.0427) (0.0179)
R2 0.4462 0.5146 0.5454 0.4853
θ -1.1102 -6.641* -5.6083* -7.418*
(29.5740) (2.0246) (1.5794) (2.2746)
α 0.1469 0.5382* 0.48278* 0.58236*
(1.4541) (0.1190) (0.0933) (0.1316)
β -0.0025 0.0088 0.0122 0.00574*
(0.0237) (0.0051) (0.0150) (0.0017)
R2 0.0322 0.4944 0.5447 0.5069
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* shows statistical significance.
MPF
Simple distance analysis 
HAS distance analysis




Table 13. Krugman results, 26 Provinces 
 
1379 1380 1381 1382
θ -1.9882* -2.0832* -2.1727* -2.0979*
(0.3958) (0.4157) (0.4413) (0.4475)
σ 7.3263* 7.0287* 6.558* 6.9719*
(1.4427) (1.3914) (1.2910) (1.4600)
μ 0.98121* 0.97999* 1.0061* 0.97469*
(0.0318) (0.0310) (0.0387) (0.0350)
τ 0.0167* 0.0165* 0.00888* 0.00846*
(0.0093) (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0010)
σ/(σ-1) 1.1581* 1.1659* 1.1799* 1.1675*
(0.0360) (0.0383) (0.0418) (0.0409)
σ(1-μ) 0.1376 0.1407 -0.0402 0.1765
(0.2317) (0.2165) (0.2543) (0.2408)
R2 0.9793 0.9820 0.9776 0.9804
θ -2.0492* -2.12* -1.2791* -2.042*
(0.4002) (0.4223) (0.2515) (0.4152)
σ 7.2286* 6.8749* 11.274* 7.1036*
(1.3948) (1.3531) (2.2310) (1.4316)
μ 0.97017* 0.98242* 0.99466* 0.98189*
(0.0319) (0.0292) (0.0197) (0.0312)
τ 0.00947* 0.00947* 0.00754* 0.00790*
(0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0015)
σ/(σ-1) 1.1605* 1.1702* 1.0973* 1.1638*
(0.0360) (0.0392) (0.0211) (0.0384)
σ(1-μ) 0.2156 0.1208 0.0602 0.1287
(0.2279) (0.1995) (0.2228) (0.2211)
R2 0.9807 0.9829 0.9919 0.9811
θ NC -2.1443* -2.0716* -2.0224*
(0.4283) (0.4169) (0.4005)
σ NC 6.9123* 6.7414* 7.2204*
(1.3672) (1.3244) (1.4196)
μ NC 0.9698* 1.0201* 0.97608*
(0.0310) (0.0388) (0.0323)
τ NC 0.00338* 0.00431* 0.00445*
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0006)
σ/(σ-1) NC 1.1691* 1.1742* 1.1608*
(0.0391) (0.0402) (0.0367)
σ(1-μ) NC 0.2088 -0.1357 0.1727
(0.2103) (0.2602) (0.2321)
R2 0.9823 0.9764 0.9813
Extreme HAS distance analysis
HAS distance analysis
Krugman
Simple distance analysis 




In the following paragraphs, we discuss general conclusions that can be drawn 
from the diverse specifications that we used.  For each model, we discuss whether 
parameter estimates were consistent with the theory, reproducible over time, or robust 
to different versions of each model.  We also look qualitatively at convergence across 
model versions to see which fit the data better.   
The single period MPF model (Table 12) was consistent with the data.  Single 
period specifications yielded measures of α that were in the neighborhood of 0.5 and 
easily statistically greater than zero in accordance with theory.  Measures of β were 
generally in the 0.01 to 0.04 inverse kilometer range, and also significantly greater 
than 0.  The parameter β can be interpreted as the drop off in economic relationships.  
Our values in the range of 0.01 to 0.04 indicate that economic interaction drops by 
approximately two thirds for every 25 to 100 km separating two Ostans.  Of course, 
for β much larger than our values, the market potential function drops to zero too 
quickly.  Therefore, our values of β appear to be reasonable.  The extreme HAS 
specification had a harder time fitting the model, though when NLS did converge its 
results were similar to those of simple distance and standard HAS.  Generally, using 
all provinces and dropping Tehran and Khuzestan, as the highest GRDPs with a 
significant gap to the rest of the provinces, made little difference.  This indicates that 
the extreme observations associated with the largest centers are not affecting 
parameter estimates. 
The time differenced MPF model performed reasonably well, but was 
sometimes unable to converge due to limited information.  This result is quite 




information was lost and convergence was unattainable.   However when 
convergence was achieved, parameter estimates were more accurate than the single 
period estimates, suggesting that differencing was a successful control.  The time 
differenced MPF model produced α estimates that were generally around 1.0, while 
the β estimates were broadly similar to those of the single period model.   
Throughout our MPF analysis, there was no reason to question the underlying 
MPF model's applicability.  In general, our estimates are roughly similar to those of 
the many MPF studies quoted in Garcia Pires (Garcia Pires, 2006), though we 
generally estimate higher α values and will discuss this in more detail in the 
conclusion. 
The single period Krugman (Table 13) converged less successfully than the 
single period MPF, though it was somewhat better when omitting Tehran and 
Khuzestan.  This suggests that influential observations of these provinces had a larger 
effect on the structural parameters of the Krugman model.  Parameter estimates for μ 
were either implausibly high or outside of allowed theoretical ranges, suggesting that 
the Krugman model does not describe the data perfectly.  When the regressions did 
converge, they tended to find σ around 7 and τ roughly between .008 and .015 with 
reasonable consistency.  Since μ was not estimated accurately, it is not possible to 
accurately discuss the estimates of σ(1-μ).  Note that this is a common problem 
throughout the empirical literature; it has been difficult to estimate µ accurately in 
other papers as well.   The estimates of σ/(σ-1) were around 1.15, and statistically 
greater than 1, implying increasing returns to scale for Iranian manufacturing.  Our 




suggesting that returns to scale might be smaller in Iran than the western countries 
surveyed (Table 14).  Though simple distance and HAS measurements were 
reasonably successful, the extreme HAS specification fit the data poorly.   
 
Table 14. Overview of results from similar studies 
 
 
The differenced Krugman model also had estimated parameters less 
accurately than the single period analog.  This could be expected, again, due to the 
informational cost of differencing.  When the estimates converge the time differenced 
model yields estimates of σ that are around 3, which is significantly lower than in the 
single period model.  The differenced Krugman model could not estimate τ very 
accurately, particularly in the model variations that exclude Tehran and Khuzestan.  
When estimated significantly, τ ranges from .003 to .04.  Since σ is lower in the 
differenced model, σ/(σ-1) is correspondingly higher, ranging from 1.3 to 1.5, though 
often estimated with less precision.  Again, the extreme HAS model performs less 
well, though the difference is not as stark as in other model versions. 
Our estimates of parameters in the Krugman and MPF models tend to be 
significant, particularly when not considering the extreme HAS distance versions.  
They are broadly qualitatively similar to the estimates of (Garcia Pires, 2006) for 
Paper Country α β σ /(σ -1)
Paluzie et al. (2005) Spain 0.083* to 0.139* 0.077* to 0.102* NA
Hanson (2005) USA 0.24* to 0.43* Not Comparable 1.6* to 2.3*
Brakman et al. (2004) Germany 0.049* 0.092* 1.25 to 1.48*
Roos (2001) W. Germany 0.02* to 0.08* 0.03* to 0.12* 1.19
De Bruyne (2002) Belgium 0.26* 0.65* 1.22
Garcia Pires (2006) Spain 0.08* to 0.24* 0.008* to 0.032* 1.23* to 1.3*




Spain and (Hanson, 2005) for the United States, though with some differences which 
could point to differences between Iran and the other western countries. 
 
Conclusions 
Data from the provinces of Iran showed generally good fit to both models as 
discussed above, and satisfied both MPF and Krugman models’ specifications. This 
could be interpreted to mean that the provinces of Iran are generally subject to notions 
of ‘New Economic Geography’ and exhibit spatial wage structure. Since the 
theoretical models hold, wages in a province do seem to be endogenously determined 
by workers choosing to move in order to maximize their effective wage. Distance also 
seems to affect wages, as they tend to be higher in regions closer to larger markets. In 
general, our results confirm Harris (1954) market potential hypothesis and similar 
studies, since in the Iranian provinces nominal wages are positively correlated with 
the distance-weighted sum of personal income in surrounding regions. 
Based on this fit of Iranian data to the NEG model, agglomeration of Iranian 
industry is promoted when economies of scale are strong, trade costs are low, and 
people spend a large portion of their income on manufactured goods. The economies 
of scale encourage Iranian firms to concentrate production in a few central city 
locations in order to exploit scale gains. Low trade and transportation costs allow 
firms to serve remote markets from central locations while demand patterns biased for 
industrial goods support larger agglomerations of firms. 
Also as mentioned earlier, in comparing our three different approaches to 




which might suggest that Tehran does not act as a universal hub for Iran. The 
convergence of the other two approaches was successful and close in the results, 
which might suggest that trade in Iran, happens in both patterns. However, σ did not 
show significant differences between three approaches which might suggest we 
cannot make a conclusive statement in comparing the three patterns. 
Another finding was that the estimates of σ/(σ-1) were lower than those 
reported in other NEG empirical literature (Table 14), suggesting that returns to scale 
might be smaller in Iran than the western countries surveyed. This might be a result of 
the nature of the technologies used in the non-farm private sector in Iran, which is 
potentially less industrial and more traditional. This would suggest that by dispersion 
and decentralization of industry Iran would have a level of loss due to a reduction in 
economy of scale but such loss would be potentially less than the loss that western 
countries would face through similar policies. It could be said that if Iran wants to 
decentralize its industry, it would be better off to do so while the nature of its industry 
allows for less loss. However, it should be noted that the Krugman model is a static 
model, and when talking about policies a dynamic view would be more accurate. 
We also found significantly and consistently higher α values in comparison to 
similar analyses of other countries (Table 14). Since α can be interpreted as the size 
of the effect of market potential on wages, our estimates suggest that Iranian wage 
levels are more strongly related to geographic market potential.  Since the countries 
that are cited in this paper are rich, developed countries (US, Japan, Germany, Spain, 




One possible interpretation of this might be to suggest that Iran has a more 
distance-sensitive trade structure than those other countries. The distance sensitivity 
might be a result of several factors. First, the transportation system between provinces 
in Iran may be less developed than in those other countries, which enhances the effect 
of distance on trade. Second, Iran is a highly mountainous country with a very diverse 
geography. This might have direct effect on the development of transportation 
systems between provinces. 
The overall result of this study corroborates the notion of centralization in the 
Iranian economy. Industry, trade, and workers all have incentives to agglomerate in 
larger cities and especially in Tehran to benefit from economies of scale in the form 
of higher wages and profits. The large wage variations explained by economic 
geography could cause significant internal migration, beyond that seen in western 
countries.  Indeed, significant internal migration has been observed in Iran in past 
years. 
The size of the effect of market potential on wages in Iran confirms the need 
for improvement in the transportation sector between provinces.  By improving 
transportation, it is possible to decrease the effective distances across Iran.  To the 
extent that lower effective distance decreases the effects of economic geography, 
improved transportation could serve to equalize wages throughout the country & 
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